A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games

Abstract

This article reports an experimental test of the M₁ ^(im) Cooperative and M₁ ^(im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M₁ ^(im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M₁ ^(im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M₁ ^(im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the core and in games in which the strength of the 13 coalition is high. These findings are consistent with the view that variations in game properties may affect the salience of different standards of fairness that underlie the M₁ ^(im) bargaining set.