Alternative Choices in Social Dilemmas

Abstract

A social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) may be characterized as a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between maximizing personal interests and maximizing collective interests. Previous research with social dilemma games has provided two choices, cooperative and competitive, and the results have shown that most subjects attempt to maximize selfish interests (respond competitively), resulting in an outcome that is detrimental to collective welfare. The purpose of this study was to assess the extent to which the introduction of an alternative (compromise) choice would facilitate cooperative behavior. Two experiments were conducted using three-person groups of undergraduate males as subjects. Experiment 1 contrasted cooperative choices in a two-choice game with a three-choice game, and as hypothesized, the results showed significantly greater cooperation in the three-choice game. Experiment 2 contrasted different types of compromise choices in a three-choice game, and the results indicated significantly different response proportions in these games. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed in terms of hypotheses proposed by Schelling, Platt, and Osgood.

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