Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining

Abstract

This article employs events data to compare two studies of crisis bargaining: a qualitative study by Snyder and Diesing based on comparative case studies, and a quantitative study by Leng and Wheeler. Three propositions are tested: (1) both disputants will adopt increasingly coercive bargaining strategies during the confrontation phase of the crisis; (2) the structure of the crisis will determine the strategies of each side once the crisis turning point is reached; (3) to maximize success, each disputant should follow a strategy consistent with the crisis structure. The authors find strong support for the first proposition, little support for the second, and modest support for the third. Interesting parallels between Snyder and Diesing's study and Leng and Wheeler's regarding the overall effectiveness of reciprocating bargaining strategies emerge.

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