Research on conflict theory, that is, studies of conflict or war using formal reasoning or mathematical approaches, is cross-classified by eight analytic approaches and eight areas of application. The analytic approaches include differential equations, decision theory/control theory, game theory, bargaining theory, uncertainty, stability theory, action-reaction models, and organization theory. The areas of application include arms races, war initiation/war termination/timing of conflict, military strategy/conduct of war, threats/crises/escalation, qualitative arms race/arms control, alliances, nuclear proliferation, and defense bureaucracy/budgets. The use of a particular analytic approach in a particular area of application entails 64 possible combinations, but research tends to cluster in only certain of these cross-classifications.
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