Abstract
In replicating an experimental design originally tested in a simulated intraorganiza tional bargaining setting, four combinations of bargaining patterns were employed in a laboratory simulation in which interrelated aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were negotiated. The principal objective was to test the effect of intraparty consensus-dissensus bargaining patterns with extremist-moderate position intensities on the outcomes of interparty negotiations between Arab and Jewish students. Two hypotheses were tested: (1) Intraparty differences, if manifested openly by both parties (bilateral dissensus), would generate more points of agreement, and a greater number of integrative outcomes, than bilateral consensus and unilateral dissensus; (2) a party which exposes its internal differences between moderates and extremists to an adversary that presents a unanimous and extremist strategy would tend to be dominated. Results confirmed the first hypothesis but failed to yield clear-cut support for the second. An attempt is made to explain and discuss the implications of these results in the context of the Middle East conflict.
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