This article defends the collective goods theory of alliances by showing that club theory is an appropriate tool for analyzing allocative issues of alliances from a positive prospective. The article concludes with a demonstration that Oppenheimer made an analytical mistake when he questioned the normative importance of Pareto optimality.
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