A new conflict analysis technique is employed to analyze the international crisis that was created when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. The Suez Crisis involved the use of strategic surprise by the Egyptians and it is clearly demonstrated how this type of situation can be readily modelled by utilizing contemporary methods from conflict analysis. The analysis algorithm provides a procedure for systematically studying the implications of the Suez Crisis and also for predicting what possible scenarios could have taken place.
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