A Competitive Test of the M 1 (i) and M 1 (im) Bargaining Sets

Abstract

Two game theoretic solution theories, the M₁ ⁽ⁱ⁾ bargaining set and the M₁ ^(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M₁ ^(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M₁ ⁽ⁱ⁾ in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences between the theories.

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