The functional relationship among the armaments of states has been the principal focus of most arms race research. The other factors which might affect armaments and which are captured in the parameters of the functional relationship, are assumed to remain constant. I argue that the assumption that parameter values remain constant imposes significant limitations upon our understanding of arms races. In this paper, I begin a systematic investigation of changes in parameter values by deducing two propositions about the occasions for changes in the value of the parameter of the organizational process model, and by demonstrating that the naval expenditures of Britain, Japan, and the United States during the period between the World Wars are consistent with both propositions.
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