Coping with MIRV in a MAD World

Abstract

Since 1965 when the problem of verifying a MIRV ban was added to the charge that MIRV was a threat to deterrence stability, the case against MIRV has remained essentially unchanged. Although MIRV was defended alternatively as a cost-effective means to cover increased Soviet targets, a hedge against Soviet ABM designs, a weapon in the domestic battle over ABM, and a bargaining chip in international negotiations, the principal charge against MIRV (counterforce threat) was never seriously disputed. Nevertheless, because of verification obstacles, both critics and supporters of the program have tended to agree that prospects for a future MIRV ban are not promising. A case is made here that MIR Ved systems themselves are not inherently destabilizing. Moreover, a practical method does exist for achieving a ban on the most destabilizing variety of MIRVs—those on land-based ICBMs. This approach, a ban or severe limitation on flight tests of missiles in a MIRVed mode, avoids the substantial verification difficulties of other MIRV reduction schemes and reinforces the principle of mutual deterrence.