This paper introduces some concepts of equilibrium payoff configurations for n-person games. They are based on the idea that a coalition must be sufficiently stable to break away from a particular payoff configuration and are extensions of the core and the bargaining sets The question of general existence is dealt with, as well as interesting dynamic properties in three-person games
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