A study of conflictive behavior in a three-person laboratory game provided support for five hypotheses or principles of survival in multipolar power systems: (1) the probability of survival is maximized by having as much or more power than the combination of all potential enemies; (2) if such hegemony is not possible, the probability of survival increases and conflict decreases following a transition from a multipolar to a bipolar power system; (3) disparity of power tends to increase conflict and reduce survival probabilities; (4) if power hegemony does not exist, survival is inversely related to power; and (5) aggressive (as opposed to pacific) behavior is positively related to survival. In addition, the conflict process was found to be a function of both structural and motivational factors.
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