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Abstract

An experiment designed to test Schelling's notion of prominence in conflict resolution varied the fairness of a mediator's suggestion and the opportunity to communicate. The conflict, drawn from one of Schelling's original examples, involved a hypothetical lost sum of money in which a mediator is called in to help settle the dispute between the loser and finder. It was predicted that the prominence effect would be strongest where the mediator's suggestion fell within accepted standards of fairness and where communication was prevented. Both predictions were generally confirmed as to frequency of specific outcomes, but mean outcomes did not seem to be affected by prominence. In addition, the use and functions of various kinds of norms in bargaining were discussed.

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Prominence as a Determinant of Bargaining Outcomes

Abstract

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