The kernel and the bargaining set are employed as predictors of experimental trials for four and five person simple majority rule games. Both concepts are found to be good predictors of game outcomes. A comparison is made between the bargaining set concepts and the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution sets which demonstrates that bargaining theory is the better predictor. The authors statistically manipulated experimental control variables to make point predictions in the kernel.
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