Abstract
It has been proposed that preponderance of power is favorable to the prevention of war, whereas relative equality of power is conducive to war. Here, the “preponderance promotes peace” proposition is applied to dyads. The author modifies this proposition by claiming that only overwhelming or ten-to-one preponderance substantially reduces the risk of war. Moreover, the “overwhelming preponderance promotes peace” proposition is placed in a wider theoretical framework that identifies dyadic and regional background conditions affecting the likelihood of hostilities. It is argued that more irreconcilable confliets of interest are found in conjunction with the absence of multilateral conflict neutralization among contiguous Asian nations than elsewhere during the fifties and sixties. These considerations determine where the peace by preponderance proposition is tested. By and large the data support the proposition, but only in conjunction with other explanatory variables is statistical significance achieved.
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