Two parties in a conflict situation go through cycles of interactive behavior. Their independent moves within these cycles can be scored along a dimension of hostile-conciliatory, but there exists no precise language to describe a pattern of moves and move responses. This article examines data from moves by nations in the cold war and from moves made by players in a laboratory conflict situation. It then develops some preliminary language for particular sequences of two-party behavior.
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