Discussions and Reviews : Models of cooperation and conflict: a critical review

Atkinson, J.W. Towards experimental analysis of human motivation in terms of motives, expectances, and incentives. In J. W. Atkinson (ed.), Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1958 .

—. An Introduction to Motivation. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964.

Bernard, J. Some current conceptualizations in the field of conflict, American Journal of Sociology, 1965, 70(4), 442-54.

Bishop, R. Game-theoretic analyses of bargaining, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1963, 77(4, Nov.), 559-602.

Boulding, K. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper, 1962.

Chatterji, M. A model of resolution of conflict between India and Pakistan, Peace Research Society Papers, 1969, 12.

Choucri, H. , and R. North. The determinants of international violence, Peace Research Society Papers, 1969, 12.

Coddington, A. Theories of the Bargaining Process. Chicago: Aldine, 1968.

Cohen, B. Conflict and Conformity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963.

Cross, J. A theory of the bargaining process, American Economics Review , 1965, 55(1, March), 67-94.

Cross, J.G. The Economics of Bargaining. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

Davidson, D. , and P. Suppes. Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957.

Deutsch, K. , and others. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Edwards, W. Behavioral decision theory, Annual Review of Psychology , 1961, 12. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.

Etzioni, A. Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965.

Fink, C. More calculations about deterrence, Journal of Conflict Resolution , 1965, 9(1, March), 54-65.

—. Some conceptual difficulties in the theory of social conflict, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1968, 12(4, Dec.), 412-460.

Foldes, L. A determinant model of bilateral monopoly, Economica , 1964, 31(May), 117-131.

Fouraker, L. , and S. Siegel. Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Galtung, J. Institutionalized conflict resolution, Journal of Peace Research , 1965, 4, 348-97.

Grimshaw, Allen D. Racial Violence in the United States. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.

Guyer, M. , and A. Rapoport. Threat in a two-person game, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6(1), 11-25.

Harsanyi, J.C. Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's theories, Econometrica, 1956, 24(April), 144-57.

Hicks, J.R. The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan , 1932.

Holsti, O. , R. Brody , and R. North. Affect and action in international reaction models, Journal of Peace Research, 1964, 3-4, 170-90.

Howard, N. Metagame analysis of Vietnam policy, Peace Research Society Papers, 1968, 10, 126-42.

Iklé, F. , and H. Leites. Political negotiations as a process of modifying utilities , Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, 6(1, March), 19-28.

Johnson, H. , and A. Cohen. Experiments in behavioral economics: Siegel and Fouraker revisited, Behavioral Science, 1967, 12(5, Sept.).

Kahn, H. Thinking About the Unthinkable. New York: Horizon, 1962.

Kautsky, K. Outbreak of the World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924.

Kelley, H. , Linda Beckman, and C. Fischer. Negotiating the division of a reward under incomplete information, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3(3, July), 361-98.

—, J. Thibaut , R. Radloff , and D. Mundy. The development of cooperation in the "minimal social situation ," Psychology Monographs, 76(19), 1-19.

McClelland, C. International interaction analysis: basic research and some practical applications . Technical Report No. 2, World Event Interaction Survey, Dept. of International Relations, University of Southern California , November 1968.

Milstein, J. , and W. Mitchell. Computer simulation of international processes: the Vietnam war and the pre-World War I naval race, Peace Research Society Papers, 1969, 12.

—, —. Dynamics of the Vietnam conflict : a quantitative analysis and predictive computer simulation, Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 1968,10.

Nash, J.F. Two cooperative games, Econometrica, 1953, 21, 128-40.

Nicholson, M. Tariff wars and a model of conflict, Journal of Peace Research , 1967, 6, 26-38.

Ofshe, R. , and L. Ofshe. A General Utility-Based Theory of Decision-Making. Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Research in Management Science, University of California, November 1968.

Patchen, M. Decision theory in the study of national action: problems and a proposal , Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9(2, June), 164-76.

—. A model of interaction in conflict of interest situations. Sociology Dept., Purdue University, 1968 (mimeo.).

— and G. Hofmann. A technique for the assessment of incentives, the value of incentives, and expectancies from the verbal outputs of decision-makers . Sociology Dept., Purdue University, 1970 (draft).

Pen, J. A general theory of bargaining, American Economic Review, 1952, 42(March), 24-42.

—. The Wage Rate Under Collective Bargaining. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1959 .

Porsholt, L. On methods of conflict prevention.

Journal of Peace Research, 1966, 2, 178-93. —. A quantitative conflict model. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1969 (draft).

Raiffa, H. Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games. In H. Kuhn and A. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. II. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953.

Rapoport, A. A Stochastic Model for Prisoner's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Preprint 108, May 1963.

— and A. Chammah. Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.

—, A. Chammah , J. Dwyer , and J. Gyr. Three-person, non-zero-sum nonnegotiable games, Behavioral Science, 1962, 7(1, Jan.), 38-58.

— and P. Dale. The models for Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1966, 3(2, July).

Rausch, H. Interaction sequences, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1965, 2, 487-506.

Richardson, L. Arms and Insecurity. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960.

Russett, B. The calculus of deterrence, Journal of Conflict Resolution , 1963, 7(2, June), 97-109.

—. Pearl Harbor: deterrence theory and decision theory, Journal of Peace Research, 1967, 6(2), 89-106.

Sawyer, J. , and H. Guetskow. Bargaining and negotiation in international relations . In H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Schelling, T. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Shackle, G.L.S. The nature of the bargaining process. In J. Dunlop (ed.), The Theory of Wage Determination. London: Macmillan, 1964 .

Shapley, L.S. A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn and A. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1953.

Sidowski, J. Reward and punishment in a minimal social situation, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 318-26.

Siegel, S. , and L. Fouraker. Bargaining and Group Decision-Making: Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill , 1960.

—, A.E. Siegel , and J.M. Andrews. Choice, Strategy, and Utility. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Singer, J.D. Inter-nation influence: a formal model, American Political Science Review, 1963, 57, 420-30.

Smoker, P. Fear in the arms race: a mathematical study, Journal of Peace Research, 1964, 1, 55-64.

—. Trade, defense, and the Richardson theory of arms races: a seven nation study , Journal of Peace Research, 1965, 2, 161-76.

Snyder, G.H. Deterrence and power, Journal of Conflict Resolution , 1960, 4(2, June), 163-78.

Stevens, C. Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Timasheff, N. War and Revolution. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965.

Walton, R. , and R. McKersie. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

Wright, Q. The escalation of international conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9(4, Dec.), 434-49.

Wyer, R. Prediction of behavior in two-person games, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13(3), 222-38.

Zeuthen, F. Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London : Routledge and Sons, 1930.