Beyond Outbidding: Armed Group Responses to Transnational Jihadist Competition

Abstract

Numerous jihadist organizations pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS) in recent years. How do armed groups respond to competition from transnational jihadist rivals? A prominent strand of research argues that increased competition leads armed groups to outbid rivals through violent escalation. However, an alternative theory suggests that groups can restrain their violence to distinguish themselves from extremist rivals and appeal to local and international audiences. We test these competing hypotheses surrounding outbidding and restraint using original data on pledges to AQ and IS and a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis of militant violence against civilians. We find that pledges to AQ or IS are associated with a moderate decline in the violence of other armed groups against civilians. Importantly, these findings are primarily driven by non-religious organizations and groups that are not formally designated as terrorists. This study contributes to research on militant competition, civilian victimization, and transnational actors.