Coups: Different Mechanisms and Their Consequences for Institution Change

Abstract

Based on an extension of selectorate theory, we characterize three structural conditions that make a coup likely: winning coalition size near the size that yields minimum utility to its members (so small or intermediate-sized coalitions), low economic productivity, and a leader relatively new to office. Policy misallocation exacerbates the risk of a coup. The theory and evidence show two mechanisms that increase the risk of coup: policy under-provision and over-provision. Leaders whose policy provisions are commensurate with expectations experience fewer coups. One anticipatory response of leaders to a heightened coup risk is to change the government’s institutions. High coup risks increase the likelihood of institution change whether a coup actually occurs or not. The threat of an under-provision coup tends to result in an expansion of the winning coalition size (democratization), while an elevated risk of an over-provision coup typically results in a contraction in coalition size whether a coup actually occurs or not.