While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.
BakD.KenwickM. R.PalmerG.. 2016. “Who’s Careful: Regime Type and Target Selection.” European Journal of International Relations22 (4): 872–96.
4.
BaniniD. 2020. “Security Sector Corruption and Military Effectiveness: The Influence of Corruption on Countermeasures against Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Small Wars & Insurgencies60 (6): 1099–1128.
5.
BapatN.2005. “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes.” Journal of Peace Research42 (6): 699–717.
6.
BarbieriK.KeshkO. M. G.PollinsB.. 2009. “Trading Data: Evaluating Our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science26: 471–91.
7.
BauschA. W.2018. “Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: an Experiment.” International Interactions44 (1): 1–32.
8.
BiddleS.2007. “Explaining Military Outcomes.” In Creating Military Power : The Sources of Military Effectiveness, edited by RisaA. B.StanleyE., 207–27. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
9.
BiddleS.LongS.. 2004. “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look.” Journal of Conflict Resolution48 (4): 525–546.
10.
BinettiM. 2024. “Far from Home: The Impact of Corruption on Tactical Military Effectiveness.” Journal of Global Security Studies9 (4): 1–21.
11.
BrattonM.Van de WalleN.. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12.
BrooksR. A.2007. “Introduction: the Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness.” In Creating Military Power : The Sources of Military Effectiveness, edited by BrooksR. A.StanleyE., 1–26. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
13.
BrooksR. 2008. Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
14.
BroseC.2020. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. New York, NY: Hachette Books.
15.
BrownC. S.FarissC. J.Blake McMahonR.. 2016. “Recouping After Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution.” International Interactions42 (1): 1-30. 10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598.
16.
Bueno de MesquitaB.SmithA.SiversonR. M.MorrowJ. D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
17.
BukkvollT.2008. “Their Hands in the Till: Scale and Causes of Russian Military Corruption.” Armed Forces & Society34 (2): 259–75.
18.
CastilloJ. 2014. Endurance and War: That National Sources of Military Cohesion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
19.
ChangE.GoldenM. A.. 2010. “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” Social Science Quarterly91 (1): 1–20.
20.
McMannK.SeimB.TeorellJ.LindbergS.. 2020. “Why Low Levels of Democracy Promote Corruption and High Levels Diminish It.” Political Research Quarterly73 (4): 893–907.
21.
McNabb CochranK.LongS. B.. 2017. “Measuring Military Effectiveness: Calculating Casualty Loss-Exchange Ratios for Multilateral Wars, 1816-1990.” International Interactions43 (6): 1019–40.
CunninghamD. E.GleditschK. S.SalehyanI.. 2013. “Non-State Actors in Civil War: a New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science30 (5): 516–31.
24.
Escriba-FolchvA.BohmeltT.PilsterU.. 2020. “Authoritarian Regimes and Civil–Military Relations: Explaining Counterbalancing in Autocracies.” Conflict Management and Peace Science37 (5): 559–79.
25.
Gentil-FernandesL.OttoJ.. 2024. “Corrupting the Battlefield: How Corruption Influences Belligerents’ Battlefield Performance.” International Interactions50 (5): 809–38.
26.
GerringJ.ThackerS. C.. 2004. “Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism.” British Journal of Political Science34 (2): 295–330.
27.
GiblerD. M.2008. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
28.
GleditschK. S.2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (5): 712–24.
29.
GrauerR.HorowitzM. C.. 2012. “What Determines Military Effectiveness? Testing the Modern System.” Security Studies21: 83–112.
30.
HendrixC.SalehyanI.. 2014. “A House Divided: Threat Perception, Military Factionalism, and Repression in Africa.” Journal of Conflict Resolution61 (8): 1653–81.
31.
JonssonO.2019. The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
32.
JungS.2022. “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes: a Cross-Country Panel Data Analysis.” Asian Perspective46 (4): 733–53.
33.
KreutzJ.2010. “How and when Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research47 (2): 243–50.
LujalaP.2010. “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources.” Journal of Peace Research47 (1): 15–28.
36.
LyallJ.2020. Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
37.
ManzettiL.WilsonC. J.. 2007. “Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?” Comparative Political Studies40 (8): 949–70.
38.
MaozZ.2010. Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 1816-2001. New York: Cambridge University Press.
39.
MaozJohnsonZ. P. L.KaplanJ.OgunkoyaF.ShreveA. P.. 2019. “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” Journal of Conflict Resolution63 (3): 811–35.
40.
MarshallM. G.GurrT. R.KeithJ.. 2016. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015. Center for Systemic Peace. https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
41.
MbaraG.GopalN.ZvaitaG.. 2021. “Corruption, Insurgency, and the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Efforts in Nigeria.” African Renaissance18 (4): 115–36.
42.
MillettA. R.MurrayW.WatmanK. H.. 1986. “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations.” International Security11 (1): 37.
43.
MontgomeryE. B.2020. “Signals of Strength: Capability Demonstrations and Perceptions of Military Power.” Journal of Strategic Studies43 (2): 309–30.
44.
NarangV.TalmadgeC.. 2018. “Civil-Military Pathologies and Defeat in War: Tests Using New Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution62 (7): 1379–1405.
45.
NolanC.2017. The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
46.
PalmerG.McManusR. W.D’OrazioV.KenwickM. R.KarstensM.ChaseB.DietrichN.KahnK.RitterK.SoulesM. J.. 2020. “The MID5 Dataset, 2011-2014: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace Science39 (4): 470–82.
47.
PevehouseJ.NordstromT.WrankeK.. 2004. “The Correlates of War 2: International Governmental Organizations Data, Version2.” Conflict Management and Peace Science21: 101–19.
48.
PowellJ.2019. “Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: a Coup-Proofing Paradox.” Armed Forces & Society45 (1): 27–44.
49.
PymanM.2017. “Addressing Corruption in Military Institutions.” Public Integrity19 (5): 513–28. 10.1080/10999922.2017.1285267.
50.
QuinlivanJ. T.1999. “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.” International Security24 (2): 131–65.
51.
ReilingK.2009. How to Assess Corruption in Defence. Tufts University.
52.
ReiterD.2020. “Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power.” Foreign Policy Analysis16 (3): 312–31.
53.
ReiterD.StamA. C.. 1998. “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness.” Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 259–77.
54.
ReiterD.WagstaffW. A.. 2018. “Leadership and Military Effectiveness.” Foreign Policy Analysis14 (4): 490–511.
55.
RentzB.2018. Russia’s Military Revival. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
56.
RoesslerP.2011. “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and CivilWar in Africa.” World Politics63 (2): 300–46.
57.
RosenS. P.1995. “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters.” International Security19 (4): 5–51.
58.
StearnsJ. 2011. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: Public Affairs.
59.
TalmadgeC.2013. “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War.” Security Studies22 (2): 180–221.
60.
TalmadgeC.2015. The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes. Cornell University Press.
61.
WeinsteinJ. M.2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
62.
ZhuJ.ZhangD.. 2017. “Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China.” Comparative Political Studies50 (9): 1186–1220.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
