Early studies of the effects of COVID-19 lockdowns on nonstate actor violence presented competing hypotheses and yielded mixed results. Economic arguments primarily claimed that lockdowns would increase violence and implied that their effects would last after lockdowns were lifted. Conversely, logistical arguments claimed that lockdowns would decrease violence and that their effects would endure only as long as lockdowns were in place. Using new, more precise, and comprehensive data and measures, this study directly compares these competing arguments globally. The study finds that both economic and logistical factors affected violence and that violence was lower overall in the short and long term. Logistical factors potentially outweighed economic ones due to the inability of nonstate actors to capitalize fully on the negative economic effects of lockdowns when population movements were disrupted. The study also disaggregates the economic effects of lockdowns, finding the strongest support for state capacity-based arguments.
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