The existing literature on terrorism focuses on the “rally-around-the-flag-effect” – a relatively short-term phenomenon. The non-immediate effects of terrorist attacks on trust in institutions, however, remain largely unexplored. Arguing that maintaining law and order and upholding peace is considered the responsibility of the political and legal institutions in democracies, we theorize the “accountability effect” suggesting that terrorist activities indicate institutional failures in preventing casualties, undermining residents’ trust in these institutions. Using over 350,000 individual-level observations from the European Social Survey, we find evidence of the accountability effect showing that exposure to terrorist activities undermines self-reported trust in various national and international institutions, including the parliament, legal institutions, the police, politicians, political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Whereas this negative relationship does not weaken with additional terrorist attacks, strong governance and high trust in institutions mitigate these adverse effects. Lastly, terrorist attacks do not affect trust among people.
AbadieA.GardeazabalJ.. 2008. “Terrorism and the World Economy.” European Economic Review52 (1): 1-27.
2.
AhernK. R. (2018). “The Importance of Psychology in Economic Activity: Evidence from Terrorist Attacks.” NBER No. w24331.
3.
AkayA.BargainO.ElsayedA. (2018). “Everybody’s a Victim? Global Terror, Well-Being and Political Attitudes.” University of Gothenburg Working Paper No. 733.
4.
AlganY.CahucP.. 2014. “Trust, Growth, and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy Implications.” Handbook of Economic Growth2: 49-120.
5.
BaliV. A.2007. “Terror and Elections: Lessons from Spain.” Electoral Studies26 (3): 669-687.
6.
BarroR. J.1973. “The Control of Politicians: an Economic Model.” Public Choice14: 19-42.
7.
BenjaminiY.YekutieliD.. 2001. “The Control of the False Discovery Rate in Multiple Testing Under Dependency.” Annals of Statistics29: 1165-1188.
8.
BerinskyAdam J.2009. In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
9.
BerrebiC.KlorE. F.. 2006. “On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution50 (6): 899-925.
10.
BerrebiC.KlorE. F.. 2008. “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate.” American Political Science Review102 (03): 279-301.
11.
BrodeurA.2018. “The Effect of Terrorism on Employment and Consumer Sentiment: Evidence from Successful and Failed Terror Attacks.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics10 (4): 246-82.
12.
De JuanA.PierskallaJ. H.. 2016. “Civil War Violence and Political Trust: Microlevel Evidence from Nepal.” Conflict Management and Peace Science33 (1): 67-88.
13.
DevosT.SpiniD.SchwartzS. H.. 2002. “Conflicts Among Human Values and Trust in Institutions.” British Journal of Social Psychology41 (4): 481-494.
14.
DinesenP. T.JægerM. M.. 2013. “The Effect of Terror on Institutional Trust: New Evidence from the 3/11 Madrid Terrorist Attack.” Political Psychology34 (6): 917-926.
15.
EichenbergR. C.StollR. J.LeboM.. 2006. “War President: The Approval Ratings of George W. Bush.” Journal of Conflict Resolution50 (6): 783-808.
16.
FearonJ. D.1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review88 (3): 577-592.
17.
FerejohnJ.1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice50: 5-25.
18.
GartnerS. S.SeguraG. M.. 1998. “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 278-300.
19.
GassebnerM.Jong-A-PinR.MierauJ. O.. 2008. “Terrorism and Electoral Accountability: One Strike, You’re Out.” Economics Letters100 (1): 126-129.
20.
GassebnerM.Jong‐A‐PinR.MierauJ. O.. 2011. “Terrorism and Cabinet Duration.” International Economic Review52 (4): 1253-1270.
21.
GodefroidtA.2023. “How Terrorism Does (And Does Not) Affect Citizens’ Political Attitudes: A Meta-analysis.” American Journal of Political Science67 (1): 22-38.
22.
GodefroidtA.LangerA.. 2020. “How Fear Drives Us Apart: Explaining the Relationship between Terrorism and Social Trust.” Terrorism and Political Violence32 (7): 1482-1505.
23.
GrosjeanP.2014. “Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries.” Comparative Economic Studies56 (3): 424-451.
24.
HardingR.NwokoloA.. 2024. “Terrorism, Trust, and Identity: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Nigeria.” American Journal of Political Science68 (3): 942-957.
25.
HetheringtonM. J.RudolphT. J.. 2008. “Priming, Performance, and the Dynamics of Political Trust.” Journal of Politics70 (2): 498-512.
26.
HetheringtonM. J.RudolphT. J.. 2018. “Political Trust and Polarization.” In The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, edited by UslanerEric M.. New York: Oxford University Press.
27.
HetheringtonM. J.RudolphT. J.. 2020. Why Washington Won’t Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
28.
HochbergY.1988. “A Sharper Bonferroni Procedure for Multiple Tests of Significance.” Biometrika75: 800-802.
29.
HutchisonM. L.2014. “Tolerating Threat? The Independent Effects of Civil Conflict on Domestic Political Tolerance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution58 (5): 796-824.
30.
JhaC. K.PandaB.SahuS. K.. 2022. “Institutions and Conflict.” Economic Modelling113: 105894.
31.
KarolD.MiguelE.. 2007. “The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 2004 US Presidential Election.” Journal of Politics69 (3): 633-648.
32.
KertzerJ. D.ZeitzoffT.. 2017. “A Bottom‐up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy.” American Journal of Political Science61 (3): 543-558.
33.
LevenduskyM. S.HorowitzM. C.. 2012. “When Backing Down is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs.” Journal of Politics74 (2): 323-338.
34.
MironovaV.WhittS.. 2017. “International Peacekeeping and Positive Peace: Evidence from Kosovo.” Journal of Conflict Resolution61 (10): 2074-2104.
35.
MontalvoJ. G.2011. “Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections.” Review of Economics and Statistics93 (4): 1146-1154.
36.
MuellerJ. E.1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
37.
NewsonR. B.2003. “Multiple-test Procedures and Smile Plots.” Stata Journal3 (2): 109-132.
38.
NewsonR. B.2010. “Frequentist Q-Values for Multiple-Test Procedures.” Stata Journal10 (4): 568-584.
39.
NickelsburgM.NorpothH.. 2000. “Commander-in-chief or Chief Economist? The President in the Eye of the Public.” Electoral Studies19 (2-3): 313-332.
40.
PeriG.ReesD. I.SmithB. (2020). “Terrorism, Political Opinions, and Election Outcomes: Evidence from Europe.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 13090.
41.
PeriG.ReesD. I.SmithB.. 2023. “Terrorism and Political Attitudes: Evidence from European Social Surveys.” Regional Science and Urban Economics99: 103864.
42.
PerrinA. J.SmolekS. J.. 2009. “Who Trusts? Race, Gender, and the September 11 Rally Effect Among Young Adults.” Social Science Research38 (1): 134-145.
43.
SangnierM.ZylberbergY.. 2017. “Protests and Trust in the State: Evidence from African Countries.” Journal of Public Economics152: 55-67.
44.
SimesR. J.1986. “An Improved Bonferroni Procedure for Multiple Tests of Significance.” Biometrika73: 751-754.
45.
SkocpolT.2002. “Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy? PS.” Political Science & Politics35 (3): 537-540.
46.
TripathiI.2022. “Are Terrorists Responsible for Anti-immigrant Sentiments? Evidence from Europe.” Economic Modelling115: 105959.
47.
TurkogluO.ChadefauxT.. 2023. “The Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Attitudes and its Duration.” Political Science Research and Methods11 (4): 893-902.
48.
ValentinoB. A.HuthP. K.CrocoS. E.. 2010. “Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War.” Journal of Politics72 (2): 528-544.
49.
WhittS.2010. “Institutions and Ethnic Trust: Evidence from Bosnia.” Europe-Asia Studies62 (2): 271-292.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
