Why do states and their agents abuse citizens? Traditional explanations focus on contentious politics, the presence of institutions, and international pressures. Despite this, accounts dissecting the state and its agents in this context of abuse remain largely theoretic in nature. This article offers a breakthrough for within-the-state accounts of human rights abuses by focusing on state leaders and their relationship to broader government institutions and function. We posit that personalist leaders have fundamentally different relationship with institutions that foster human rights respect, arguing that leaders relying on their own merits and qualities are less likely to either activate or manipulate institutions of accountability for human rights abuses. Using data from 1991 to 2019, we show that the presence of leaders legitimizing themselves within personalist framing can worsen human rights conditions.
Amnesty International. 2019. “Brazil: Bolsonaro Administration is Transforming Anti-Human-Rights Rhetoric into Action.” Amnesty International, May 21, 2019.
2.
BagwellStephenHallShelby L.. 2020. “Publicity and Perceptions of Risk: The Effects of HRO Naming and Shaming on Sovereign Credit Rating.” Journal of Human Rights19 (3): 379-91.
3.
BegerAndreasHillDanielJr.2019. “Examining Repressive and Oppressive State Violence Using the Ill-Treatment and Torture Data.” Conflict Management and Peace Science36 (6): 626-44.
4.
BellSam R.BhasinTavishiClayK. ChadMurdieAmanda. 2014. “Taking the Fight to Them: Neighborhood Human Rights Organizations and Domestic Protest.” British Journal of Political Science44 (4): 853-75.
5.
BellSam R.ClayK. ChadMurdieAmanda. 2012. “Neighborhood Watch: Spatial Effects of Human Rights INGOs.” The Journal of Politics74 (2): 354-68.
6.
BellemareMarc F.MasakiTakaakiPepinskyThomas B.. 2017. Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effect. Journal of Politics79 (3): 949-63.
7.
Bonilla-SilvaEduardo. 2006. Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
8.
ButlerChristopher K.GluchTaliMitchellNeil J.. 2007. “Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of a Principal—Agent Argument.” Journal of Peace Research44 (6): 669-87.
9.
CaldeiraTeresa P. R.HolstonJames. 1999. “Democracy and Violence in Brazil.” Comparative Studies in Society and History41 (4): 691-729.
10.
CaoXunWardHugh. 2015. “Winning Coalition Size, State Capacity, and Time Horizons: An Application of Modified Selectorate Theory to Environmental Public Goods Provision.” International Studies Quarterly59 (2): 264–279. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12163. In press.
11.
ChoE.2020. “The Trump Administration Weakens Standards for ICE Detention Facilities.” ACLU News and Commentary14.
12.
CingranelliDavidFajardo-HeywardPaolaFilippovMikhail. 2014. “Principals, Agents and Human Rights.” British Journal of Political Science44 (3): 605-30.
13.
CingranelliDavidFilippovMikhail. 2010. “Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights.” The Journal of Politics72 (1): 243-57.
14.
CingranelliDavid L.RichardsDave L.ClayK. Chad. 2014. “The Cingranelli–Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.” https://www.humanrightsdata.com
15.
ClayK. ChadDigiuseppeMatthew R.. 2017. “The Physical Consequences of Fiscal Flexibility: Sovereign Credit and Physical Integrity Rights.” British Journal of Political Science47 (4): 783-807.
16.
ConradCourtenay R.ConradJustinWalshJames IgoePiazzaJames A.. 2017. “Who Tortures the Terrorists? Transnational Terrorism and Military Torture.” Foreign Policy Analysis13 (4): 761-86.
17.
ConradCourtenay R.HaglundJillienneMooreWill H.. 2013. “Disaggregating Torture Allegations: Introducing the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Country-Year Data.” International Studies Perspectives14 (2): 199-220.
18.
ConradCourtenay R.HillDaniel W.JrMooreWill H.. 2018. “Torture and the Limits of Democratic Institutions.” Journal of Peace Research55 (1): 3-17.
19.
ConradCourtenay R.MooreWill H.. 2011. “The Ill-Treatment & Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project Specific Allegation Data User’s Guide.”
20.
ConradCourtenay R.RitterEmily Hencken. 2013. “Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law.” The Journal of Politics75 (2): 397-409.
CorralesJavier. 2018. Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23.
DavenportChristian. 2007. State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24.
DavenportChristianArmstrongDavid A.. 2004. “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996.” American Journal of Political Science48 (3): 538-54.
25.
DeMerittJacqueline H. R.2015. “Delegating Death: Military Intervention and Government Killing.” Journal of Conflict Resolution59 (3): 428-54.
26.
EnglehartNeil A.2009. “State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights.” Journal of Peace Research46 (2): 163-80.
27.
FarissChristopher J.2014. “Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability.” American Political Science Review108 (2): 297-318.
28.
FarissChristopherKenwickMichaelReuningKevin. 2019. “Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 4.” Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TADPGE
29.
FinnemoreMarthaSikkinkKathryn. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization52 (4): 887-917.
30.
FoaRoberto StefanMounkYascha. 2017. “The Signs of Deconsolidation.” Journal of Democracy28 (1): 5-15.
31.
GibneyMarkMatthew Dalton. 1996. “The Political Terror Scale.” Policy Studies and Developing Nations4 (1): 73–84. In press.
32.
GibneyMarkCornettLindaWoodReedHaschkePeterArnonDanielPisanòAttilioBarrettGrayParkBaekkwan. 2022. “Political Terror Scale 1976-2021.” https://www.polit-ic-al-ter-rorscale.org
33.
GleditschNils PetterWallensteenPeterErikssonMikaelSollenbergMargaretaStrandHåvard. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research39 (5): 615-37.
34.
HaschkePeter. 2017. Human Rights in Democracies. London: Routledge.
35.
HathawayOona A.2001. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference.” Yale Lj111: 1935.
36.
HillDaniel W.2016. “Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights.” The Journal of Politics78 (3): 822-35. https://doi.org/10.1086/685450
37.
HillDaniel W.JonesZachary M.. 2014. “An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression.” American Political Science Review108 (3): 661-87.
38.
HillebrechtCourtney. 2012. “The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights Law: Case Studies from the Inter-American Human Rights System.” Human Rights Quarterly34 (4): 959-85. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2012.0069
HunterWendyPowerTimothy J.. 2019. “Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash.” Journal of Democracy30 (1): 68-82. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0005
41.
JacksonJoshua L.HallShelby L.HillDaniel W.. 2018. “Democracy and Police Violence.” Research & Politics5 (1): 205316801875912. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018759126
42.
KeckMargaret E.SikkinkKathryn. 1998. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society.” In The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, 217-37. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
43.
MarshallMonty G.GurrTed RobertJaggersKeith. 2016. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015.” Center for Systemic Peace13.
44.
MooreWill H.1998. “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing.” American Journal of Political Science42 (3): 851. https://doi.org/10.2307/2991732
45.
MouffeChantal. 2000. The Democratic Paradox. La Vergne: verso.
46.
MüllerJan-Werner. 2017. What Is Populism?London: Penguin UK.
47.
MurdieAmandaBhasinTavishi. 2010. “Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest.” Journal of Conflict Resolution55 (2): 163-91. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002710374715
48.
MurdieAmanda M.DavisDavid R.. 2011. “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs1.” International Studies Quarterly56 (1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x
49.
PetersonTimothy M.MurdieAmandaAsalVictor. 2016. “Human Rights, NGO Shaming and the Exports of Abusive States.” British Journal of Political Science48 (3): 767-86. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000065
50.
PoeSteven C.2019. “The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach to the Research on Human Rights and Repression.” Understanding Human Rights Violations (June): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351143806-3
51.
PoeSteven C.TateC. Neal. 1994. “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review88 (4): 853-72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082712
52.
PoeSteven C.TateC. NealKeithLinda Camp. 1999. “Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993.” International Studies Quarterly43 (2): 291-313. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00121
53.
RejaliDarius. 2009. “Torture and Democracy.” In Torture and Democracy. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
54.
RitterEmily HenckenConradCourtenay R.. 2016. “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression.” American Political Science Review110 (1): 85-99.
55.
SimmonsBeth. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
TannenbergMarcusBernhardMichaelGerschewskiJohannesLührmannAnnavon SoestChristian. 2020. “Claiming the Right to Rule: Regime Legitimation Strategies from 1900 to 2019.” European Political Science Review13 (1): 77-94. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773920000363
58.
VirdeeSatnam. 2019. “Racialized Capitalism: An Account of its Contested Origins and Consolidation.” The Sociological Review67 (1): 3-27.
59.
WoodE.J.2006. “Variation in Sexual Violence During War.” Politics & Society34 (3): 307–342. In press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
