Do Proxies Provide Plausible Deniability? Evidence From Experiments on Three Surveys

Abstract

A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.