Why do some states possess more advanced military technologies than others? Our study explores the vertical proliferation of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), seeking to understand which demand- and supply-side factors best explain why some countries acquire more sophisticated LACMs. We theorize that states’ security environments, regime types, possession of related strategic technologies, and membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) influence the possession of more sophisticated cruise missiles. Our analysis employs a unique new global dataset with granular data on every LACM national militaries have deployed. We use this dataset to evaluate the proliferation of LACMs across the international system from 1991–2015. Using a selection model that first controls for the horizontal proliferation of LACMs, we find that insecurity, scientific and technical expertise from related technologies, the possession of highly authoritarian and highly democratic regimes, and MTCR membership all have positive effects on the sophistication of LACM-possessors’ arsenals.
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