How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.
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