Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target’s resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or mis-imputation of resolve; revelation of information, character, or capabilities; or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments, we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques—a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators—to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.
AbrahmsMax. 2008. “What Terrorists Really Want Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy.” International Security32 (4): 78–105.
2.
AndersonScott. 2017. “Coercion.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), edited by ZaltaEdward N.. Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/coercion/.
3.
BarnhartJoslyn. 2017. “Humiliation and Third-party Aggression.” World Politics69 (3): 532–68.
4.
BaumMatthew A.PotterPhilip B. K.. 2015. War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
BergenPeter L.2006. The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda’s Leader. New York: Simon & Schuster.
7.
BerinskyAdam J.HuberGregory A.LenzGabriel S.. 2012. “Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk.” Political Analysis20 (3): 351–68.
8.
BlouinF. J.IngelidoM. J.. 1962. “U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo Operation Northwoods Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba.” National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/.
9.
BoettcherWilliamA.IIICobbMichael D.. 2006. “Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq.” Journal of Conflict Resolution50 (6): 831–54.
10.
BuhrmesterMichaelKwangTracyGoslingSamuel D.. 2011. “Amazon’s Mechanical Turk a New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-quality, Data?” Perspectives on Psychological Science6 (1): 3–5.
11.
BymanDanielWaxmanMatthew. 2002. The Dynamics of Coercion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univeristy Press.
12.
CallwellCharles Edward. 1927. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bart., GCB, DSO: His Life and Diaries (Vol. 1). New York: C. Scribner’s Sons.
13.
CarlisleRodney. 2007. “The Attacks on US Shipping that Precipitated American Entry into World War I.” Nothern Mariner17 (3): 41.
14.
CarterDavid B.2016. “Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks.” International Organization70 (01): 133–73.
15.
ChoHyun-Binn. 2018. “Tying The Adversary’s Hands: Provocation, Crisis Escalation, And Inadvertent War.” Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3100. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3100.
16.
CoppockAlexander. 2019. “Generalizing from Survey Experiments Conducted on Mechanical Turk: A Replication Approach.” Political Science Research and Methods7 (3): 613–28.
17.
CrayRobert E.2005. “Remembering the USS Chesapeake: The Politics of Maritime Death and Impressment.” Journal of the Early Republic25 (3): 445–74.
18.
DafoeAllanRenshonJonathanHuthPaul. 2014. “Reputation and Status as Motives for War.” Annual Review of Political Science17:371–93.
19.
DafoeAllanZhangBaobaoCaugheyDevin. 2018. “Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments.” Political Analysis26 (4): 399–416.
DalyMartinWilsonMargo. 1988. Homicide. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
22.
MesquitaDeBuenoBruceDicksonEric S.. 2007. “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization.” American Journal of Political Science51 (2): 364–81.
23.
De MesquitaBuenoBruceSiversonRandolph M.. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” American Political Science Review89 (4): 841–55.
24.
DyerGeoff. 2014, September5. “Americans Grow Willing to Accept Military Intervention.” Financial Times.
25.
FearonJames D.1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review88 (03): 577–92.
26.
FearonJames D.1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization49 (3): 379–414.
27.
FearonJames D.1998. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by StokesSusan C.PrzeworskiAdamManinBernard, 55–97. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
28.
FischerDavid Hackett. 1989. Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
29.
GadarianShana Kushner. 2010. “Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose Candidates.” The Journal of Politics72 (4): 1046–62.
30.
GartnerScott Sigmund. 2008, February. “The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach.” American Political Science Review102 (1): 95–106.
31.
GartnerScott SigmundSeguraGary M.. 1998, June. “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 278–300.
32.
GelpiChristopherFeaverPeter D.ReiflerJason. 2009a. Paying the Human Costs of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
33.
GelpiChristopherFeaverPeter D.ReiflerJason. 2009b. Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
34.
GerberAlan S.GreenDonald P.. 2012. Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
35.
GershkoffAmyKushnerShana. 2005. “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric.” Perspectives on Politics3 (3September): 525–37.
36.
GottfriedMatthew S.TragerRobert F.. 2016. “A Preference for War: How Fairness and Rhetoric Influence Leadership Incentives in Crises.” International Studies Quarterly60 (2): 243–57.
37.
HallTodd H.2011. “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger.” Security Studies20 (4): 521–55.
38.
HallTodd H.2016. “On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco-Prussian War.” Security Studies26 (1): 1–29.
HenrichJosephMcElreathRichardBarrAbigailEnsmingerJeanBarrettClarkBolyanatzAlexanderCardenasJuan CamiloGurvenMichaelGwakoEdwinsHenrichNatalieLesorogolCarolynMarloweFrankTracerDavidZikeJohn. 2006. “Costly Punishment Across Human Societies.” Science312 (5781): 1767–70.
44.
HerringGeorge C.2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
45.
HuffConnorTingleyDustin. 2015. ““Who Are these People?” Evaluating the Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents.” Research & Politics2 (3). doi: 2053168015604648.
46.
JervisRobert. 2013. “Causation and Responsibility in a Complex World.” InBack to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World, edited by FinnemoreMarthaGoldsteinJudith, 313–38. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
47.
KaganDonald. 1995. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday.
48.
KalyvasStathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
KrebsRonald R.LobaszJennifer K.. 2007. “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11 Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq.” Security Studies16 (3): 409–51.
51.
KurizakiShuhei. 2007. “Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy.” American Political Science Review101 (03): 543–58.
52.
KyddAndrew H.WalterBarbara F.. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International Security31 (1): 49–80.
53.
LaiBrianReiterDan. 2005. “Rally ‘Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001.” International Studies Quarterly49 (2): 255–72.
54.
LarsonEric V.1996. Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
55.
LebowRichard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press, October.
56.
LichbachMark Irving. 1987. “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent.” Journal of Conflict Resolution31 (2): 266–97.
57.
Lynn-JonesSean M.1985. “A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea.” International Security9 (4): 154–84.
58.
McCulloughMichael. 2008. Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
59.
MillerWilliam Ian. 2005. Eye for an Eye. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
60.
MillerWilliam Ian. 2009. Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
61.
MuellerJohn E.1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
62.
MyersonRoger B.2007. Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist’s Perspective. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
63.
NisbettRichard E.CohenDov. 1996. Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
64.
NordstromByron J.2000. Scandinavia since 1500. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
65.
O’NeillBarry. 1999. Honor, Symbols and War. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
66.
OrenMichael B.2003. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. New York: Random House.
67.
OyeKenneth A.1993. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
RoccoLorenzoBalloZié. 2008. “Provoking a Civil War.” Public Choice134 (3-4): 347–66.
78.
RussettBruce. 1990. Controlling the Sword. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
79.
SaganScott. 1988. “The Origins of the Pacific War.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History18 (4): 893–922.
80.
SaganScott D.SuriJeremi. 2003. “The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrey, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969.” International Security27 (4): 150–83.
81.
SartoriAnne E.2002. “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes.” International Organization56 (1): 121–49.
82.
SchellingThomas C.1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
TomzMichaelWeeksJessicaYarhi-MiloKeren. 2020. “How and Why Does Public Opinion Affect Foreign Policy in Democracies.” International Organization74 (1): 119–43.
92.
TragerRobert F.2010. “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters.” The American Political Science Review104 (02): 347–68.
93.
TuckerRobert W.2007. Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914-1917. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
94.
ValentinoBenjamin A.HuthPaul K.CrocoSarah E.. 2010. “Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War.” The Journal of Politics72 (2): 528–44.
WawroGeoffrey. 2005. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
97.
WeisigerAlexYarhi-MiloKeren. 2015. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics.” International Organization69 (02): 473–95.
98.
WeissJessicaDafoeAllan. 2017. “Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China.” Working paper. http://bit.ly/1W9rkaz.
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
