Abstract
Despite growing concerns about the effects of environmental changes, we only have disparate and seemingly contradictory findings about the relationship between natural disasters and intrastate violence. This article addresses that problem by introducing postdisaster reconstruction as a primary explanatory variable for intrastate violence. I extend bargaining theory to predict that postdisaster reconstruction causes a commitment problem, which in turn incentivizes warring parties to fight for the strategic opportunities of reconstruction. Using an instrumental variable approach, I provide an empirical test with a subnational data set for Sri Lanka before and after the 2004 Tsunami. Consistent with my expectations, housing reconstruction increased the number of violent events, while housing destruction had no discernible impact on violence.
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