Civil wars have a tendency to spread across borders. In several instances of conflict diffusion, however, conflicts spread well after their cessation at home. Whereas existing diffusion research has not attached much importance to this observation, I argue that these conflicts are instances of a broader pattern of postconflict diffusion. Wars are particularly prone to spread after termination because the end of fighting generates a surplus of weapons, combatants, and rebel leaders whose fortunes are tied to the continuation of violence. Some of these resources circulate throughout the region via the small arms trade and through transnational rebel networks, making this a time at which it should be easier for nonstate groups in the neighborhood to build a capable rebel army. The results from two complementary statistical tests on global conflict data provide strong support for such a postconflict diffusion effect.
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