Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war. In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war. After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finance and war onset.
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