Can issue linkage, the combining of multiple issues into a single agreement, enhance the credibility of an agreement? I use the alliance relations of buffer states (states located between two recently or currently warring rivals) to test the claim that issue linkage enhances compliance with treaty obligations. The alliance relations of buffer states create a “hard case” for treaty compliance because, by being prone to invasion and occupation, buffer states have difficulties inducing states to remain committed to an alliance agreement. Hence, if linkage provisions can enhance the credibility of alliance commitments for buffer states, then linkage provisions should improve treaty compliance in nearly any context. I find that buffer states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer opportunistic violations of the alliance terms, avoid occupation and invasion at a higher rate, and experience fewer third-party attacks than buffer states in other alliance arrangements.
AggarwalVinod. ed.1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
2.
Albrecht-CarriéRené. 1958. A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. New York: Harper & Brothers.
3.
AxelrodRobertKeohaneRobert. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.”World Politics38 (1): 226–54.
4.
AysegulAydin. 2010. “The Deterrent Effects of Economic Integration.”Journal of Peace Research47 (5): 523–33.
5.
BenedickR. E.1991. Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6.
BennettScott. 1997. “Measuring Rivalry Termination.”Journal of Conflict Resolution41 (2): 227–54.
7.
BernheimDouglasWhinstonMichael. 1990. “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior.”RAND Journal of Economics21 (1): 1–26.
8.
BlaineyGeoffrey. 1988. The Causes of War. 3rd ed. London, England: MacMillan Press.
9.
Bueno de MesquitaBruceLalmanDavid. 1992. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
10.
DavisChristina. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization.”American Political Science Review98 (1): 153–69.
11.
DavisChristina. 2009. “Linkages in Economic and Security Bargaining: Evidence from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.”International Security33 (3): 143–79.
12.
DownsGeorgeRockeDavidBarsoomPeter. 1996. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?”International Organization50 (3): 379–406.
13.
EichengreenBarryFriedenJeffry. 1993. “The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction.”Politics and Economics5 (2): 85–104.
14.
FazalTanisha. 2004. “State Death in the International System.”International Organization58 (2): 311–44.
15.
FazalTanish. 2007. State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
16.
FearonJames D.1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.”International Organization49 (3): 379–414.
17.
FearonJames D.1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.”The Journal of Conflict Resolution41 (1): 68–90.
18.
FearonJames D.1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.”International Organization52 (2): 269–305.
19.
FrankelJeffreyRoseAndrew. 2005. “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting out the Causality.”The Review of Economics and Statistics87 (1): 85–91.
20.
GaddisJohn Lewis. 1992. The United States and the Cold War: Implications, Reconsideration, Provocations. New York: Oxford University Press.
21.
GaddisJohn Lewis. 1999. “Conclusion.” In Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since1945, edited by GaddisJohn LewisGordonPhillipMayErnestRosenbergJonathan, 260–71. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
22.
GeorgeAlexanderSmokeRichard. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
23.
GoertzGaryDiehlPaul. 1992. “The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries.”International Interactions18 (2): 151–63.
24.
GhosenFatenPalmerGlennBremerStuart. 2004. “The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.”Conflict Management and Peace Science21 (2): 133–54.
25.
Hafner-BurtonEmilie. 2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression.”International Organization59 (3): 593–629.
26.
HuthPaul. 1988. “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War.”American Political Science Review82 (2): 423–43.
27.
HuthPaulRussettBruce. 1984. “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980.”World Politics36 (4): 496–526.
28.
JervisRobert. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
29.
JervisRobert. 1988. “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons.”International Security13 (2): 28–38.
30.
KoremenosBarbaraLipsonCharlesSnidalDuncan. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.”International Organization55 (4): 761–99.
LeedsBrett AshleySavunBurcu. 2007. “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”The Journal of Politics69 (4): 1118–32.
33.
LohmannSusanne. 1997. “Linkage Politics.”Journal of Conflict Resolution41 (1): 38–67.
34.
LongAndrewLeedsBrett Ashley. 2006. “Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements.”Journal of Peace Research43 (4):433–51.
35.
MaxwellStephen. 1968. Rationality in Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 50. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
36.
MayerFrederick. 1992. “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments.”International Organization46 (4): 793–818.
37.
McGinnisMichael. 1986. “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation.”Journal of Conflict Resolution30 (1): 141–70.
38.
MearsheimerJohn. 1983. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
39.
MearsheimerJohn. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.
40.
MitchellBrian R.1998. International Historical Statistics: 1750 – 1993. London: Macmillan.
41.
MorrowJames. 1992. “Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining.”International Studies Quarterly36 (2): 153–72.
42.
MorrowJames D.1994. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.”Journal of Conflict Resolution38 (2): 270–97.
43.
MuellerJohn. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
44.
OrganskiA. F. K.KuglerJacek. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
45.
OyeKenneth. ed.1979. Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
46.
PoastPaul. 2012. “Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945.”International Organization 66 (2): 277–310.
47.
PowersKathy. 2004. “Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances.”International Interactions30 (4): 373–95.
48.
PowersKathy. 2006. “Dispute Initiation and Alliance Obligations in Regional Economic Institutions.”Journal of Peace Research43 (4): 453–71.
49.
PowersKathyGoertzGary. 2006. “The Evolution of Regional Economic Institutions into Security Institutions.”Unpublished Manuscript.
50.
PöyhönenPentti. 1963. “A Tentative Model for the Volume of Trade between Countries.”Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv90 (1): 93–99.
51.
SchellingThomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Boston: Harvard University Press.
52.
SebeniusJames. 1983. “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties.”International Organization37 (2): 281–316.
53.
SimmonsBeth. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.”American Political Science Review94 (4): 819–35.
54.
SimmonsBeth. 2010. “Treaty Compliance and Violation.”Annual Review of Political Science13: 273–96.
55.
SmithAlastair. 1995. “Alliance Formation and War.”International Studies Quarterly39 (4): 405–25.
56.
SpagnoloGiancarlo. 2001. “Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation,”CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 2778. Available athttp://www.cepr.org/.
57.
SteinArthur. 1980. “The Politics of Linkage.”World Politics33 (1): 62–81.
58.
SteinerZara. 2005. The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
59.
TinbergenJan. 1962. Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
60.
TollisonRobertWillettThomas. 1979. “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations.”International Organization33(4): 425–49.
61.
TomzMichael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
62.
Von SteinJana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.”American Political Science Review99 (4): 611–22.
63.
WaltzKenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
64.
WandyczPiotr. 1962. France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919 - 1925. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
