Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.
Barbieri, Katherine.2003. The liberal myth. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press.
2.
Barnaby, Frank.1993. How nuclear weapons spread: Nuclear-weapon proliferation in the 1990s. New York: Routledge .
3.
Bayer, Resat.2006. Diplomatic exchange data set. Correlates of War Project . http://correlatesofwar.org (accessed December 28, 2008).
4.
Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katherine M. Floros .2006. Alliances, internal information, and military conflict among member states. International Organization60 (3): 595-625.
5.
Beardsley, Kyle, and Victor Asal.2009. Winning with the bomb: The advantages of being a nuclear power. Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2).
6.
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker.1998. Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science42 (4): 1260-88.
7.
Bennett, D. Scott.1996. Security, bargaining, and the end of interstate rivalry. International Studies Quarterly40 (June): 157-84.
8.
Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam.2000. Research design and estimator choices in the analysis of interstate dyads: When decisions matter. Journal of Conflict Resolution44 (5): 653-85.
9.
---. 2001. EUGene: Expected utility and data management program, version 2.250 [computer program]. Pennsylvania State University and Dartmouth University.
10.
Betts, Richard.1977a. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .
Blainey, Geoffrey.1988[1973]. The causes of war. New York : Free Press.
13.
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan .1978. Force without war: US armed forces as a political instrument. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
14.
Boehmer, Charles.2001. Economic growth, strategic interaction, and interstate conflict. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 20-25.
15.
Boulding, Kenneth.1962. Conflict and defense. New York : Harper & Row.
16.
Bremer, Stuart.1992. Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war. Journal of Conflict Resolution36 (2): 309-41.
17.
Brodie, Bernard.1959. Strategy in the missile age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18.
---, ed. 1946. The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order . New York: Harcourt, Brace.
19.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce.1981. The war trapNew Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
20.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman.1992. War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
21.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and William H. Riker .1982. An assessment of the merits of selective nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution26 (2): 283-306.
22.
Bush, George W.2002. The national security strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: National Security Council.
23.
Caprioli, Mary, and Peter F. Trumbore .2005. Rhetoric versus reality: Rogue states in interstate conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (5): 770-91.
24.
Clausewitz, Carl von.1976 [1832]. On war. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25.
Crescenzi, Mark J. C., and Andrew J. Enterline .2001. Time remembered: A dynamic model of interstate interaction. International Studies Quarterly45 (3): 409-31.
26.
Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz.2000. War and peace in international rivalry . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
27.
Doyle, Michael.1997. Ways of war and peace: Realism, liberalism, and socialism . New York: Norton.
28.
Dunn, Lewis A., and Herman Kahn.1976. Trends in nuclear proliferation, 1975-1995 . Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute .
29.
Fearon, James D.1994. Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of the crisis bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution38 (2): 236-69.
30.
---. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization49 (3): 379-414.
31.
Freedman, Lawrence.1981. The evolution of nuclear strategy. New York: St. Martin's.
32.
Fuhrmann, Matthew.2009. Taking a walk on the supply side: The determinants of civilian nuclear cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution53:181-208.
33.
Gaddis, John Lewis.1983. The rise, fall, and future of detente. Foreign Affairs62 (2): 354-77.
34.
---. 1989. The long peace: Inquiries into the history of the Cold War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
35.
---. 2005. Strategies of containment: A critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War. New York : Oxford University Press.
36.
Gartzke, Erik.1998. Kant we all just get along? Motive, opportunity, and the origins of the democratic peace. American Journal of Political Science42 (1): 1-27.
37.
Gartzke, Erik, and Matthew Kroenig .2009. A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution53:151-160.
38.
Gates, Scott, Haavard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Haavard Strand.2006. Institutional inconsistency and political instability: Polity duration, 1800-2000. American Journal of Political Science50 (4): 893-908.
39.
Geller, Daniel S.1990. Nuclear weapons, deterrence, and crisis escalation . Journal of Conflict Resolution34 (2): 291-310.
40.
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer.2004. The MID 3 data set, 1993-2001: Procedures, coding rules, and description. Conflict Management and Peace Science21 (2): 133-54.
41.
Gibler, Douglas M., Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchinson .2005. Taking arms against a sea of troubles: Conventional arms races during periods of rivalry. Journal of Peace Research42 (2): 131-47.
42.
Gleditsch, Kristian.2002. Expanded trade and GDP data. Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (5): 712-24.
43.
---. 2003. All politics is local: The diffusion of conflict, integration, and democratization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
44.
Gochman, Charles S., and Zeev Maoz.1984. Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1976: Procedure, patterns, and insights. Journal of Conflict Resolution28 (4): 585-615.
45.
Grieco, Joseph M.1990. Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
46.
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore .1989. Polity II: Political structures and regime change [codebook]. University of Maryland.
47.
Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell.2007. Issue Correlates of War Project: User manual for ICOW data, V. 1.1. Codebook.
48.
Horowitz, Michael.2009. The spread of nuclear weapons and international conflict: Does experience matter?Journal of Conflict Resolution53:234-257.
49.
Huth, Paul K.1988. Extended deterrence and the prevention of war. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
50.
---. 1990. The extended deterrent value of nuclear weapons . Journal of Conflict Resolution34 (2): 270-90.
51.
Huth, Paul K., and Bruce Russett.1984. What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics36 (4): 496-526.
52.
---. 1988. Deterrence failures and crisis escalation. International Studies Quarterly32 (1): 29-45.
53.
---. 1993. General deterrence between enduring rivals: Testing three competing models. American Political Science Review87 (1): 61-73.
54.
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted R. Gurr .1995. Transitions to democracy: Tracking democracy's "Third Wave" with the Polity III Data. Journal of Peace Research32 (4): 469-82.
55.
Jervis, Robert.1984. The illogic of American nuclear strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
56.
---. 1988. The political effects of nuclear weapons: A comment . International Security13 (2): 80-90.
57.
---. 1989a. Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence. World Politics42 (2): 183-207.
58.
---. 1989b. The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
59.
Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke.2007. Determinants of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative model. Journal of Conflict Resolution51 (1): 167-94.
60.
Jones, Daniel, Stuart Bremer, and J. David Singer .1996. Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science15 (2): 163-213.
61.
Kahn, Herman.1960. On thermonuclear war. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
62.
Kennan, George F.1947. The sources of Soviet conduct. Foreign AffairsXV:575-6.
63.
Kimball, Anessa L.2006. Alliance formation and conflict initiation: The missing link. Journal of Peace Research43 (4): 371-89.
64.
Kissinger, Henry.1957. Nuclear weapons and foreign policy. New York: Harper.
65.
Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl .2006. The new rivalry dataset: Procedures and patterns. Journal of Peace Research43 (3): 331-48.
66.
Koremenos, Barbara.2001. Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility. International Organization55 (2): 289-326.
67.
Kroenig, Matthew.2009a. Exporting the bomb: Why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. American Political Science Review103 (1).
68.
---. 2009b. Importing the bomb: Sensitive nuclear assistance and nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution53:161-180.
69.
Kugler, Jacek.1984. Terror without deterrence: Reassessing the role of nuclear weapons. Journal of Conflict Resolution28 (3): 470-506.
70.
Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein .1995. We all lost the Cold War . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
71.
Leeds, Brett Ashley.2003. Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. International Organization57:801-27.
72.
LeFeber, Walter.2002. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
73.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian Pollins.2001. The study of interdependence and conflict: Recent advances, open questions, and directions for future research. Journal of Conflict Resolution45 (6): 834-59.
74.
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett.1993. Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review87 (3): 624-38.
75.
Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers.2002. Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2002. College Park : University of Maryland, CIDCM.
76.
McMillan, Susan.1997. Interdependence and Conflict. Mershon International Studies Review41 (1): 33-58.
77.
Mearsheimer, John J.1984. Nuclear weapons and deterrence in Europe. International Security9 (3): 19-46.
78.
---. 1990. Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security15 (1): 5-56.
79.
---. 1993. The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. Foreign Affairs72 (3): 50-66.
80.
---. 2001. The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton.
81.
Morgan, Patrick M.1977. Deterrence: A conceptual analysis. Los Angeles: Sage.
82.
Morrow, James.1991. Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances. American Journal of Political Science35 (4): 904-33.
83.
---. 2000. Alliances: Why write them down?Annual Review of Political Science3:63-83.
84.
Mueller, John.1988. The essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons: Stability in the postwar war. International Security13 (2): 55-79.
85.
Neumayer, Eric.2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (6): 925-53.
86.
Newey, Whitney.1987. Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous explanatory variables. Journal of Econometrics36:231-50.
87.
Nicolson, Harold George.1960. Diplomacy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
88.
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett.1999. The Kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. World Politics52 (1): 1-37.
89.
Oneal, John R., Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum .2003. Causes of peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. International Studies Quarterly47 (3): 371-93.
90.
O'Neill, Barry.2006. Nuclear weapons and national prestige. Cowles Foundation discussion paper no. 1560. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
91.
Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler.1980. The war ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
92.
Osgood, Robert E., and Robert W. Tucker .1967. Force, order, and justice . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
93.
Paul, T.V.1995. Nuclear taboo and war initiation in regional conflicts . Journal of Conflict Resolution39 (4): 696-717.
94.
Powell, Robert.1990. Nuclear deterrence theory: The search for credibility . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
95.
Quackenbush, Stephen L., and Michael Rudy.2006. Evaluating the monadic democratic peace [type-script]. University of Missouri-Columbia.
96.
Rauchhaus, Robert W.2009. Evaluating the nuclear peace hypothesis: A quantitative approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution53:258-277.
97.
Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth .1996. Assessing the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, 1918-1988. American Political Science Review90 (3): 512-33.
98.
Russett, Bruce.1989. The real decline in nuclear hegemony. In Global changes and territorial challenges: Approaches to world politics for the 1990s, ed. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, 177-93. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
99.
---. 1993. Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold war world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
100.
Russett, Bruce, and John R. Oneal .2001. Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. New York : Norton.
101.
Sagan, Scott D.1989. Moving targets: Nuclear strategy and national security . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
102.
---. 1996. Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb. International Security21 (3): 54-86.
103.
---. 2004. Nuclear dangers in South Asia. Forum on Physics & Society41 (6): 4-7.
104.
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz .2003. The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate. New York: Norton.
105.
Sample, Susan G.1998. Military buildups, war, and realpolitik: A multivariate model. Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (2): 156-75.
106.
---. 2002. The outcomes of military buildups: Minor states vs. major powers. Journal of Peace Research39 (6): 669-91.
107.
Schelling, Thomas C.1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
108.
---. 1966. Arms and influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
109.
Schweller, Randall.1998. Deadly imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's strategy of world conquest. New York: Columbia University Press.
110.
Simmons, Beth A., and Daniel J. Hopkins .2005. The constraining power of international treaties: Theory and methods. American Political Science Review99 (4): 623-31.
111.
Singh, Sonali, and Christopher Way .2004. The correlates of nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution48 (6): 859-85.
112.
Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer .1973. The diplomatic importance of states, 1816-1970: An extension and refinement of the indicator. World Politics25 (4): 577-99.
113.
---. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 44-45.
114.
Snyder, Glenn H.1965. The balance of power and the balance of terror . In The balance of power, ed. Paul Seabury , 184-201. San Francisco: Chandler.
115.
Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing.1977. Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision-making, and system structure in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
116.
United Nations.1995. Charter of the United Nations. In The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations.
117.
Waltz, Kenneth N.1981. The spread of nuclear weapons: More may be better. Adelphi Papers, no. 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
118.
---. 1990. Nuclear myths and political realities. American Political Science Review84 (3): 731-45.
