Why are states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-à-vis much weaker adversaries? The theory I develop focuses on how the nature of a strong state's war aims affects prewar uncertainty about the cost of victory. I argue that the relative magnitude of the effect of military strength and resolve on war outcomes varies with the nature of the object at stake and that strong states become more likely to underestimate the cost of victory as the impact of resolve increases relative to that of war-fighting capacity. I evaluate the empirical implications of this theory against the historical record provided by the universe of major power military interventions since World War II. The results challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors such as military strength, resolve, troop commitment levels, and war-fighting strategies on asymmetric war outcomes.
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan.2001. How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict . International Security26 (1): 93-128.
2.
Bacevich, Andrew J.2003. “Splendid little war”: America's Persian Gulf adventure ten years on. In The Gulf War of 1991 reconsidered , edited by Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, 149-64. London: Frank Cass.
3.
Baldwin, David A.1979. Power analysis and world politics: New trends versus old tendencies. World Politics31 (2): 161-94.
4.
Bennett, D.S., and A.C. Stam.1998. The declining advantages of democracy: A combined model of war outcomes and duration. Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 344-66.
5.
Biddle, Stephen.1996. Victory misunderstood: What the Gulf War tells us about the future of conflict. International Security21 (2):139-80.
6.
———. 2004. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
7.
Blainey, Geoffrey.1973. The causes of war. New York : Free Press.
8.
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan .1978. Force without war: U.S. armed forces as a political instrument. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution.
9.
Boulding, Ken.1963. Conflict and defense: A general theory. New York: Harper and Row.
10.
Brooks, Risa, and Elizabeth A. Stanley .2007. Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
11.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce.1981. The war trap. New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.
12.
———. 2000. Principles of international politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
13.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
14.
Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman.2002. The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
15.
Cannizzo, Cynthia A.1980. The costs of combat: Death, duration, and defeat . In The correlates of war II: Testing some realpolitik models , edited by J. David Singer, 233-57. New York: Free Press.
16.
Cimbala, Stephen J.1994. Military persuasion: Deterrence and provocation in crisis and war. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
17.
Claude, Inis L.1964. Swords into plowshares. 3rd ed. New York: Random House.
18.
Clausewitz, Carl von.1976. On war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
19.
Clodfelter, Micheal.2002. Warfare and armed conflicts: A statistical reference to casualty and other figures, 1500-2000. Jefferson, NC : McFarland & Company.
20.
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay .2003. America unbound: The Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
21.
Danilovic, Vesna.2001. The sources of threat credibility in extended deterrence . Journal of Conflict Resolution45 (3): 341-69.
22.
Desch, Michael C.2002. Democracy and victory: Why regime type hardly matters . International Security27 (2): 5-47.
23.
Downie, Richard Duncan.1998. Learning from conflict: The U.S. military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the drug war. Westport, CT: Praeger.
24.
Fearon, James D.1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization49 (3): 379-414.
25.
Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner.2002. A bargaining model of war and peace: Anticipating the onset, duration, and outcome of war. American Journal of Political Science46 (4): 819-83
26.
Gartner, Scott S.1997. Strategic assessment in war. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
27.
Gartner, Scott S., and Randolph M. Siverson .1996. War expansion and war outcome . Journal of Conflict Resolution40 (1): 4-15.
28.
Gates, John M.1993. The limits of power: The U.S. conquest of the Philippines . In Great powers and little wars: The limits of power, edited by A. Hamish Ion and E. J. Errington, 124-43. Westport, CT: Praeger .
29.
George, Alexander L., and William E. Simons, eds. 1994. The limits of coercive diplomacy. Boulder, CO: Westview.
30.
Goemans, H.E.2000. War and punishment: The causes of war termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31.
Hess, Gary R.1986. The military perspective on strategy in Vietnam . Diplomatic History10 (Winter): 91-106.
32.
Howard, Michael.1990. Why UN sanctions are better than a prolonged war . The Times, London, August 17, Features.
33.
Jackman, Robert.1993. Power without force: The political capacity of nation-states . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
34.
Johnson, Dominic D. P.2004. Overconfidence and war: The havoc and glory of positive illusions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
35.
Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer .1996. Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science15:163-213.
36.
Keaney, Thomas A., and Eliot A. Cohen.1995. Revolution in warfare? Air power in the Persian Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
37.
Kier, Elizabeth.1997. Imagining war: French and British military doctrine between the wars, Princeton studies in international history and politics . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38.
Krepinevich, Andrew F.1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University Press.
39.
Lake, David A.1992. Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war. American Political Science Review86 (1): 24.
40.
Levite, Ariel, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman.1992. Foreign military intervention: The dynamics of protracted conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.
41.
Long, J. Scott.1997. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage .
42.
Mack, Andrew.1975. Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflict. World Politics27 (2):175-200.
43.
Maoz, Zeev.1983. Resolve, capabilities, and the outcomes of interstate disputes, 1816-1976. Journal of Conflict Resolution27 (2):195-229.
44.
———. 1989. Power, capabilities, and paradoxical conflict outcomes . World Politics41 (2): 239-66.
45.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers.2002. Polity IV Dataset, version p4v2002 . College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
46.
Merom, Gil.2003. How democracies lose small wars. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press.
47.
Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. 1988. The effectiveness of military organizations. In Military effectiveness, vol. 1, The First World War, edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray.Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin.
48.
Mueller, John E.1980. The search for the “breaking point” in Vietnam: The statistics of a deadly quarrel. International Studies Quarterly24 (4): 497-519.
49.
Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler.1980. The war ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
50.
Pape, Robert Anthony.1996. Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
51.
Posen, Barry.1984. The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
52.
Powell, Colin.1995. My American journey. New York : Random House.
53.
Powell, Robert.2004. Bargaining and learning while fighting. American Journal of Political Science48 (2): 344-61.
54.
Record, Jeffrey.1993. Hollow victory: A contrary view of the Gulf War . Washington, DC: Brassey's (U.S.).
55.
Record, Jeffrey, and W. Andrew Terrill .2004. Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, similarities, and insights. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
56.
Reiter, Dan, and Curtis Meek.1999. Determinants of military strategy, 1903-1994: A quantitative empirical test. International Studies Quarterly43 (2): 363.
57.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. Democracy and battlefield military effectiveness . Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 259-77.
58.
———. 2002. Democracies at war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59.
Rosen, Steven.1972. War power and the willingness to suffer. In Peace, war, and numbers, edited by Bruce M. Russett, 167-83. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
60.
Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth.1996. Assessing the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, 1918-88. American Political Science Review90 (3): 512-34.
61.
Sarkesian, Sam C.1990. U.S. strategy and unconventional conflicts: The elusive goal. In The U.S. Army in a new security era, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and JohnAllenWilliams , 195-215. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
62.
Schelling, Thomas C.1966. Arms and influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
63.
Schultz, Kenneth A.2001. Looking for audience costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution45 (1): 32-60.
64.
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey.1972. Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. In Peace, war, and numbers , edited by B. Russett, 19-48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
65.
Siverson, Randolph M.1995. Democracies and war participation: In defense of the institutional constraints argument. European Journal of International Relations1 (4): 481-9.
66.
Slantchev, Branislav.2003. The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed states. American Political Science Review97 (1): 123-33.
67.
Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam.2005. When likely losers go to war. In New direction for international relations, edited by A. Mintz and B. Russett, 179-198. New York: Lexington Books.
68.
Stam, Allan C.1996. Win, lose, or draw: Domestic politics and the crucible of war. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
69.
Stiles, Kendall W.2004. Case histories in international politics, 3rd ed. New York: Parson Education.
70.
Sullivan, Patricia, and Scott Gartner.2006. Disaggregating peace: Domestic politics and dispute outcomes. International Interactions32 (2): 1-26.
71.
Summers, Harry G.1982. On strategy: A critical analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio.
72.
Tilemma, Herbert.2001. Overt military intervention and international conflict . Paper presented at the Uppsala Conference on Conflict Data, Uppsala, Sweden, June 8-9.
73.
Towle, Philip.1991. Pundits and patriots: Lessons from the Gulf War . London: Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies.
74.
U.S. Senate.1990. Armed Services Committee. Persian Gulf Crisis. Testimony by General William Odom. November 30.
75.
Wagner, Harrison.2000. Bargaining and war. American Journal of Political Science44 (3): 469-84.
76.
Waltz, Kenneth Neal.1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
77.
Wang, Kevin, and James Lee Ray.1994. Beginners and winners: The fate of initiators of interstate wars involving great powers since 1495. International Studies Quarterly38 (1): 139-54.
78.
Wayman, Frank W., J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz.1983. Capabilities, allocations, and success in militarized interstate disputes and wars, 1816-1976. International Studies Quarterly27 (4): 497-515.
79.
Werner, Suzanne.1998. Negotiating the terms of settlement: War aims and the bargaining leverage. Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (3): 321-43.
80.
______. 2000. Deterring intervention: The stakes of war and third-party involvement. American Journal of Political Science44 (4): 720-32.
81.
Wright, Quincy.1965. A study of war. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
