Does congressional opposition constrain the president's conflict behavior in response to poor economic performance? Other research has shown that legislative constraints such as divided government reduce the executive's propensity to initiate conflict. But institutional constraints on democratic leaders may also make them likely to use force abroad when faced with deteriorating domestic conditions. The author argues that legislative constraints on presidential action during periods of economic decline compel the president to pursue alternatives that he can implement without congressional approval to display his leadership skills—including the use of military force abroad. The author examines the interactive effects of congressional opposition and economic performance on the propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2000. The president is more likely to use force in response to economic decline when facing an opposition Congress than during years in which he enjoys partisan support in the legislature.
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