This article addresses an important gap in research on the causes of civil war: the lack of a theory that explains why lootable resources like alluvial diamonds are linked to civil war in some cases and peace in others. To help fill this gap, we propose a revenue-centered theoretical framework that shifts the focus from rebels to rulers and states, situates rulers in the context of the institutional and economic constraints on their ability to earn revenue, and combines this focus on revenue with a focus on state spending. In countries rich in lootable resources, the ability of rulers to achieve political order depends on (1) the availability of nonlootable resources; (2) the mode of extraction of lootable resources, especially whether they are extracted by hard-to-tax artisans or, alternatively, by large, taxable industrial firms; and (3) patterns of state spending. This framework supplements widely used models of civil war that emphasize the state’s capacity to defeat an insurgency yet do not answer the important prior question of why state capacity varies so widely across resource-rich countries.
Addy, Samuel N.1998. Ghana: Revival of the mineral sector. Resources Policy24 (4): 229-239.
2.
Arulpragasam, Jehan, and David E. Sohn. 1997. Economic transition in Guinea: Implications for growth and poverty. New York: New York University Press.
3.
Ardant, Gabriel. 1975. Financial policy and economic infrastructure of modern states and nations. In The formation of national states in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
4.
Auty, Richard, ed. 2001. Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5.
Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution46: 599-628.
6.
Brady, Henry E., and David Collier, eds. 2004. Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards. Berkeley: Rowman & Littlefield/Berkeley Public Policy Press.
7.
Buhaug, Halvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. The geography of civil war. Journal of Peace Research39 (4): 417-433.
8.
Callaghy, Thomas M.1990. Lost between state and market: The politics of economic adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria. In Economic crisis and policy choice: The politics of adjustment in the third world, ed. Joan M. Nelson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 1998. Political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments: Taxation in democracies and dictatorships. World Politics50 (3): 349-376.
11.
Coakley, Geoge J.2002. The mineral industry of Ghana. In Minerals yearbook, area reports: International 2000, Africa and the Middle East. Vol. 3. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey.
12.
Cohen, Youssef, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski. 1981. The paradoxical nature of state making: The violent creation of order. American Political Science Review75 (4): 901-910.
13.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers50 (14): 563-573.
14.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. Military expenditure: threats, aid and arms races. World Bank Working Paper: The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence. Washington, DC: World Bank.
15.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers56 (4): 563-596.
16.
Coppedge, Michael. 2001. Explaining democratic deterioration in Venezuela through nested induction. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, San Francisco.
17.
De Soysa, Indra. 2000. The resource curse: Are civil wars driven by rapacity or paucity? In Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil war, ed emas Berdal and David Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
18.
Ellis, Stephen. 1999. The mask of anarchy. New York: New York University Press.
19.
Englebert, Pierre, and James Ron. 2004. Primary commodities and war: Congo-Brazzaville’s ambivalent resource curse. Comparative Politics37 (1): 61-81.
20.
Fearon, James D.2004. Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 275-302.
21.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1999. Weak states, rough terrain, and large-scale ethnic violence since 1945. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, Atlanta, GA.
22.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review97: 75-90.
23.
Gberie, Lansana. 2001. Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the potential for wider humanitarian catastrophe. Occasional Paper 1, the Diamonds and Human Security Project. Ottawa, Canada: Partnership Africa Canada.
24.
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. Case studies and theories of organizational decision making. In Advances in information processing in organizations, vol.2. SantaBarbara, CA: JAI Press.
25.
Grossman, Herschel. 1999. Kleptocracy and revolutions. Oxford Economic Papers51: 267-283.
26.
Gyimah-Boadi, E.1999. Ghana: The challenges of consolidating democracy. In State, conflict, and democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
27.
Harden, Blaine. 2000. Africa’s diamond wars. New York Times, April 6.
28.
Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992. American Political Science Review95: 33-48.
29.
Henk, D., and M. Rupiya. 2001. Funding defense: Challenges of buying military capability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.
30.
Herbst, J.1993. The politics of reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley: University of California Press.
31.
Herbst, J.2004. African militaries and rebellion: The political economy of threat and combat effectiveness. Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 357-370.
32.
Hirsch, John L.2001. Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the struggle for democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.1999. Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
35.
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms. Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (4): 508-537.
36.
Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye ag Mohamed. 2003. Senegal and Mali. Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York.
37.
Janse, A. J. A. (Bram).1995. A history of diamond sources in Africa: Part I. Gems & Gemology31: 228-255.
38.
Janse, A. J. A. (Bram).1996. A history of diamond sources in Africa: Part II. Gems & Gemology32: 2-30.
39.
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states. Berkeley: University of California Press.
40.
Keen, David. 1998. The economic functions of violence in civil wars. Adelphi Paper 320. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
41.
Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography20 (5): 561-584.
42.
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of rule and revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
43.
Levinson, Alfred A., John J. Gurney, and Melissa B. Kirkley. 1992. Diamond sources and production: Past, present, and future. Gems & Gemology28 (4): 234-254.
44.
Lieberman, Evan S.2004. Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for cross-national research. Working Paper, Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
45.
Lujala, Päivi, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (4): 538-563.
46.
Moore, Mick. 2004. Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing countries. International Political Science Review25: 297-319.
47.
Musgrave, Richard. 1969. Fiscal systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
48.
Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede. 1990. Cross-national variations in political violence: A rational action approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution34: 624-651.
49.
Parunak, H., R. Savit, and R. Riolo. 1998. Agent-based modeling vs. equation-based modeling: A case study and user’s guide. In Proceedings of Multi-Agent Systems and Agent-Based Simulation (MABS’98), 10-25. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
50.
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The logic of comparative social inquiry. New York: John Wiley.
51.
Reno, William. 1995. Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
52.
Reno, William. 1998. Warlord politics and African states. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
53.
Richards, Paul. 1996. Fighting for the rain forest: War, youth, and resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford, UK: James Currey.
54.
Ross, Michael. 2003. Oil, drugs, and diamonds: The varying roles of natural resources in civil war. In The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
55.
Ross, Michael. 2004a. How does natural resource wealth influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases. International Organization58 (1): 35-68.
56.
Ross, Michael. 2004b. What do we know about natural resources and civil war?Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 337-356.
57.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. Using case studies to expand economic models of civil war. Perspectives on Politics2: 259-279.
58.
Schumpeter, Joseph A.1991. The crisis of the tax state. In Joseph A. Schumpeter: The economics and sociology of capitalism, ed. Richard Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59.
Scott, James C.1999. Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
60.
Shafer, D. Michael. 1994. Winners and losers: How sectors shape the developmental prospects of states. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
61.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Snyder, Richard. 2001. Does lootable wealth breed disorder? States, regimes, and the political economy of extraction. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, San Francisco.
64.
Snyder, Richard. 2004. Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy of extraction framework. Working Paper 312, the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN. http://www.nd.edu/%7Ekellogg/WPS/312.pdf.
65.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From mobilization to revolution. New York: Random House.
66.
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.
67.
Traub, James. 2000. The worst place on earth. New York Review of Books, June 29.
68.
United States Geological Survey. 2002. Minerals yearbook, area report: International 2000. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey.
69.
Van der Laan, H. L.1965. The Sierra Leone diamonds: An economic study covering the years 1952-1961. London: Oxford University Press.
70.
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.
71.
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P.1992. Guerillas and revolution in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
72.
Zack-Wiliams, Alfred. 1995. Tributors, supporters and merchant capital: Mining and underdevelopment in Sierra Leone. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.
73.
Zack-Williams, Babatunde. 1990. Diamond mining and underdevelopment in Sierra Leone: 1930/1980. Africa Development15 (2): 95-117.
