Why did France and Great Britain cooperate in Operation Enduring Freedom after September 11, 2001, and fail to achieve cooperation in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003? Operational code analysis is used to test the threat-cooperation proposition that common perceptions of a security externality and common prescriptions toward it lead to cooperation, whereas an absence of common perceptions or prescriptions leads to a lack of cooperation. Operational code analysis is well suited for this task because it conceptualizes the “self in situation,” with the self having diagnostic propensities about a security externality and prescriptive propensities toward this situation. An examination of these propensities in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom lends strong support for the threat-cooperation proposition.
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