Many international relations theorists suggest that improved military capabilities will make the use or threat of military force a more attractive policy choice. Tests of this argument are complicated because policy makers’anticipation of their future needs for military capabilities could also produce a relationship between capabilities and policy choice. Results show that military capabilities indeed increase the frequency with which force is used, but although past uses of force influence the construction of military capabilities, evidence that decision makers can effectively anticipate their current needs is weak. The results also suggest that the recent trend in force structure toward a smaller number of high-value weapons and relatively well-paid personnel has mitigated the relationship between military spending and the use of force.
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