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Abstract

One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Keywords

public good free riding cooperation punishment experiment

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