Relative Gains Concerns when the Number of States in the International System Increases

Abstract

Realists argue that relative gains concerns make cooperation more difficult than liberal institutionalists expect. In response, Duncan Snidal has argued that when the number of states increases, the problem of relative gains concerns is generally attenuated. The author contends that current analysis of the impact of increasing the number of states is contingent on two implicit and inaccurate assumptions. Relative gains concerns, rather than being relative “absolute” gains concerns, are relative “percentage” gains concerns, and currently, an increase in the number of states is caused by the breakup of a state. Using these new assumptions, the author shows that when the number of states increases, the negative impact of relative gains concerns can continue under many conditions to inhibit cooperation. The results have specific predictions about changes in the likelihood of cooperation due to state breakup, such as the Soviet Union, and state merging, such as the European Union.