Joanne Gowa's 1998 article “Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad” is examined in light of issues raised by her empirical analysis. Newly available time-series models for event-count data permit consideration of the dynamics of the use-of-force series. It is possible that the relationship between decisions to use force and the major independent variables has changed since 1870. More appropriate data on U.S. uses of force and a wider range of indicators for the major independent variables permit a more convincing test of the hypotheses she presents. The reanalysis supports some of her conclusions, particularly those concerning election cycles and partisanship. However, it also indicates that her analysis underestimated the importance of domestic economic conditions and suggests some important qualifications to her conclusion that international conditions are the main determinant of U.S. decisions to use force.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Alesina, Alberto . 1988. Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. American Economic Review78 (4): 796-805.
2.
Auerswald, David P.2000. Disarmed democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3.
Bailey, Michael A. , Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The institutional roots of American trade policy: Politics, coalitions, and international trade. World Politics49 (3): 309-338.
4.
Beck, Nathaniel . 1982. Parties, administrations, and American macroeconomic policy outcomes. American Political Science Review76:83-93.
5.
Blechman, Barry M. , and Stephen S. Kaplan. 1978. Force without war. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
6.
Brandt, Patrick T. , and John T. Williams. 2001. A linear Poisson autoregressive model: The Poisson AR(p). Political Analysis9 (2): 164-184.
7.
Brandt, Patrick T. , John T. Williams, Benjamin O. Fordham, and Brian Pollins. 2000. Dynamic modeling for persistent event-count time series. American Journal of Political Science44 (4): 823-843.
8.
Carmines, Edward G. , and James L. Stimson. 1989. Issue evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
9.
Clark, David H.2000a. Agreeing to disagree: Domestic institutional congruence and U.S. dispute behavior. Political Research Quarterly53 (2): 375-400.
10.
Clark, David H. 2000b. Can strategic interaction divert diversionary behavior? A model of strategic interaction and U.S. conflict propensity. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 27-30, in Chicago.
11.
Cronin, Patrick , and Benjamin O. Fordham. 1999. Timeless principles or today's fashion? Testing the stability of the linkage between ideology and foreign policy in the Senate. Journal of Politics61 (4):967-998.
12.
Dassel, Kurt , and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. Domestic strife and the initiation of violence at home and abroad. American Journal of Political Science43 (1): 56-85.
13.
DeRouen, Karl R., Jr . 1995. The indirect link: Politics, the economy and the use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution39:671-695.
14.
DeRouen, Karl R., Jr . 2000. Presidents and the diversionary use of force: A research note. International Studies Quarterly44:317-328.
15.
Drazen, Allan . 2000. Political economy in macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
16.
Ellsberg, Daniel . 1972. The quagmire myth and the stalemate machine. In Papers on the war. New York: Simon & Schuster.
17.
Enterline, Andrew J. , and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2000. Threats, opportunity, and force: Repression and the diversion of domestic pressure, 1948-1982. International Interactions26 (1): 21-53.
18.
Ferguson, Thomas . 1984. From normalcy to New Deal: Industrial structure, party competition, and American public policy in the Great Depression. International Organization38 (1): 59-85.
19.
Fordham, Benjamin O.1998a. Partisanship, macroeconomic policy, and U.S. uses of force, 1949-1994. Journal of Conflict Resolution42:418-439.
20.
Fordham, Benjamin O.1998b. The politics of threat perception and the use of force: A political economy model of U.S. uses of force, 1949-1994. International Studies Quarterly42:567-590.
21.
Fordham, Benjamin O. , and Christopher C. Sarver. 2001. Militarized interstate disputes and United States uses of force. International Studies Quarterly45:455-466.
22.
Frieden, Jeffry A.1988. Sectoral conflict and U.S. foreign economic policy, 1914-1940. International Organization42 (1): 59-90.
23.
Gaubatz, Kurt T.1991. Election cycles and war. Journal of Conflict Resolution35:212-244.
24.
Gelpi, Christopher . 1997. Democratic diversions. Journal of Conflict Resolution41:255-282.
25.
Gill, Jeff . 1999. The insignificance of null hypothesis significance testing. Political Research Quarterly52 (3): 647-674.
26.
Gowa, Joanne . 1998. Politics at the water's edge: Parties, voters and the use of force abroad. International Organization52 (2): 307-324.
27.
Hess, Gregory D. , and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. War politics: An economic, rational-voter framework. American Economic Review85 (4): 828-846.
28.
Hibbs, Douglas . 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review71:1467-1487.
29.
James, Patrick , and Athansios Hristoulas. 1994. Domestic politics and foreign policy: Evaluating a model of crisis activity for the United States. Journal of Politics56 (2): 327-348.
30.
James, Patrick , and John R. Oneal. 1991. The influence of domestic and international politics on the president's use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution35:307-332.
31.
Jones, Daniel M. , Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science15 (2): 163-213.
32.
King, Gary . 1989. Variance specification in event count models: From restrictive assumptions to a generalized estimator. American Journal of Political Science33 (3): 762-784.
33.
Leeds, Brett Ashley , and David R. Davis. 1997. Domestic political vulnerability and international disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution41:814-834.
34.
Legro, Jeffrey W.2000. Whence American internationalism. International Organization54 (2): 253-289.
35.
McMaster, H. R.1997. Dereliction of duty. New York: HarperCollins.
36.
Meernik, James . 1994. Presidential decision making and the political use of military force. International Studies Quarterly38:121-138.
37.
Meernik, James . 2000. Modeling international crises and the political use of military force by the USA. Journal of Peace Research37 (5): 547-562.
38.
Meernik, James , and Peter Waterman. 1996. The myth of the diversionary use of force by American presidents. Political Research Quarterly49 (3): 573-590.
39.
Miller, Ross A.1995. Domestic structures and the diversionary use of force. American Journal of Political Science39 (3): 760-785.
40.
Miller, Ross A.1999. Regime type, strategic interaction, and the diversionary use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution43:388-402.
41.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin , and Will H. Moore. 2002. Presidential uses of force during the cold war: Aggregation, truncation, and temporal dynamics. American Journal of Political Science46 (2): 438-452.
42.
Morgan, T. Clifton , and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. Domestic discontent and the external use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution36:25-52.
43.
Ostrom, Charles W. , and Brian Job. 1986. The president and the political use of force. American Political Science Review80:541-566.
44.
Rogers, James Grafton . 1945. World policing and the Constitution. Boston: World Peace Foundation.
45.
Romer, Christina D.1989. The prewar business cycle reconsidered: New estimates of gross national product, 1869-1908. Journal of Political Economy97 (1): 1-37.
46.
Russett, Bruce . 1990. Economic decline, electoral pressure, and the initiation of interstate conflict. In Prisoners of war?, edited by Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
47.
Singer, J. David . 1961. The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. In The international system: Theoretical essays, edited by Sydney Verba and Klaus Knorr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
48.
Smith, Alastair . 1996. Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. International Studies Quarterly40:133-153.
49.
Stoll, Richard J.1984. The guns of November: Presidential reelections and the use of force, 1947-1982. Journal of Conflict Resolution28:231-246.
50.
Trubowitz, Peter . 1998. Defining the national interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
51.
U.S. Bureau of the Census . 1975. Historical statistics of the United States, colonial times to 1970. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
52.
Waltz, Kenneth N.1959. Man, the state, and war. New York: Columbia University Press.
53.
Wang, Kevin H.1996. Presidential responses to foreign policy crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution40:68-97.
54.
Ward, Michael D. , and Ulrich Widmaier. 1982. The domestic-international conflict nexus: New evidence and old hypotheses. International Interactions9 (1): 75-101.
55.
Williams, John T.1990. The political manipulation of macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review84:767-795.
56.
Zakaria, Fareed . 1998. From wealth to power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
