Armed with a new threat and promising technology, advocates of national missile defense (NMD) have framed the debate by presenting NMD as a break from traditional deterrence principles. The assumption that the United States faces new adversaries that cannot be deterred by U.S. offensive options and whether adversaries can and will use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States, given its inclination and ability to retaliate, are assessed. The effectiveness of NMD against various offensive threats is simulated. Conclusions indicate that NMD advocates have not made their case that cold war-era deterrence principles are ill suited to U.S. relations with fledgling nuclear states and that the expected value of a missile defense of any type and scale is low because it is unlikely to enhance global security above levels offered by retaliatory deterrence.
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