As a manifestation of its self-reliance doctrine, the state of Israel has acted unilaterally in the military realm throughout its history. Several scholars have also linked Israeli actions to elections and the economy in the context of diversionary theory. Hypotheses derived from earlier empirical work on internalization-externalization linkages and additional causal hypotheses are tested to enhance diversionary theory. Vector autoregression (VAR) is used to relax causal assumptions and test basic relationships in the Israeli case from 1948 to 1998. Findings suggest that Israel responds militarily to Arab military actions and domestic political protests. However, Israeli actions also lead to more domestic protests. The potential for this reciprocal relationship is typically ignored in the current diversionary research program. Arab military actions appear to be driven by Israeli military actions and seem to decrease in response to Israeli actions.
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