The effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas is examined. Participants played simultaneously several finitely repeated, two-person prisoner's dilemma games. Results show that unilateral choice leads to lower defection and fewer exits than mutual choice. In the unilateral-choice setup, intending defectors are more likely to exit than intending cooperators. Implications of these findings in the political context are discussed.
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