Does bilateral reciprocity or great-power influence (or both) promote the emergence of international cooperation in regional conflicts? Using machine-coded events data and vector autoregression, time-series analysis of 12 international dyads in the Middle East between 1979 and 1990 and 1991 and 1995 found bilateral reciprocity widespread in both time periods, characterizing nearly all dyads of sustained conflict and a majority of other dyads with various power and proximity characteristics. Significant triangular responses to U.S. actions occurred in only a few cases, although key ones—Iraq with its neighbors and Israel with Palestine. Neither bilateral reciprocity nor triangular response predicted changes in long-term conflict and cooperation. Rather, the presence of one or both of these response patterns appeared to be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for regional states to increase long-term cooperation.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Achen, Christopher H. 2000. Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, 20-22 July, at the University of California, Los Angeles.
2.
Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1996. Debt games: Strategic interaction in international debt rescheduling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
3.
Axelrod, Robert . 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
4.
Axelrod, Robert, and Lisa D'Ambrosio. 1994. Annotated bibliography on the evolution of cooperation. Working paper, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
5.
Axelrod, Robert , and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics38:226-254. Reprinted in Cooperation under anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
6.
Baldwin, David A. , ed. 1993. Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate. New York: Columbia University Press.
7.
Balkan Action Council . 1998. Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement will not bring sustainable peace to Kosovo (Press release, 16 October). Washington, DC: Balkan Action Council.
8.
Blau, Peter M. 1964. Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley.
9.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce , and David Lalman. 1992. War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
10.
Bugental, Daphne Blunt , and Jacqueline J. Goodnow. 1998. Socialization processes. In Social, emotional, and personality development, edited by Nancy Eisenberg, 389-462. Vol. 3 of Handbook of child psychology, 5th ed., edited by William Damon. New York: Wiley.
11.
Conybeare, John A. 1987. Trade wars: The theory and practice of international commercial rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press.
12.
Council on Foreign Relations . 1997. CFR Task Force report: U.S. Middle East policy and the peace process (Henry Siegman, project director). New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
13.
Cromwell, Jeff B. , Michael L. Hannan, Walter C. Labys, and Michel Terraza. 1994. Multivariate tests for time series models. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
14.
Crossette, Barbara . 1998. Suddenly, Saddam feels alone in the Arab world. New York Times, 29 November.
15.
de Waal, Frans . 1996. Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16.
Dickey, David A. , and Wayne A. Fuller. 1979. Distribution of the estimators of autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical Association74 (I): 427-431.
17.
Downs, George W. , David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1985. Arms races and cooperation. World Politics38 (October): 118-146. Reprinted in Cooperation under anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
18.
Evangelista, Matthew . 1990. Cooperation theory and disarmament negotiations in the 1950s. World Politics42 (July): 502-528.
19.
Fahmy, Ismail . 1983. Negotiating for peace in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
20.
Freeman, John R. , John T. Williams, and Tse-min Lin. 1989. Vector autoregression and the study of politics. American Journal of Political Science33 (November): 842-877.
21.
George, Alexander L. , Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds. 1988. U.S.-Soviet security cooperation: Achievements, failures, lessons. New York: Oxford University Press.
22.
Gerner, Deborah J. , Philip A. Schrodt, Ronald Francisco, and Judith L. Weddle. 1994. The analysis of political events using machine coded data. International Studies Quarterly38 (March): 91-119.
23.
Gilpin, Robert . 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
24.
Goldstein, Joshua S.1991. Reciprocity in superpower relations: An empirical analysis. International Studies Quarterly35 (June): 195-209.
25.
Goldstein, Joshua S.1992. A conflict-cooperation scale for international events data. Journal of Conflict Resolution36 (June): 369-385.
26.
Goldstein, Joshua S. , and John R. Freeman. 1990. Three-way street: Strategic reciprocity in world politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
27.
Goldstein, Joshua S.1991. US-Soviet-Chinese relations: Routine, reciprocity, or rational expectations?American Political Science Review85 (March): 17-35.
28.
Goldstein, Joshua S. , and Jon C. Pevehouse. 1997. Reciprocity, bullying, and international cooperation: Time-series analysis of the Bosnia conflict. American Political Science Review91 (September): 515-529.
29.
Gowa, Joanne . 1986. Anarchy, egoism, and third images: The evolution of cooperation and international relations. International Organization40 (Winter): 167-186.
30.
Jervis, Robert . 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31.
Jervis, Robert . 1982. Security regimes. International Organization36 (Spring): 357-378. Reprinted in International regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
32.
Jervis, Robert . 1988. Realism, game theory, and cooperation. World Politics40 (April): 317-349.
33.
Kelman, Herbert . 1985. Overcoming the psychological barrier: An analysis of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Negotiation Journal1 (July): 213-234.
34.
Kemp, Geoffrey , and Jeremy Pressman. 1997. Point of no return: The deadly struggle for Middle East peace. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.
35.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36.
Keohane, Robert O.1986. Reciprocity in international relations. International Organization40 (Winter): 1-27.
37.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The world in depression 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California Press.
38.
Kolodziej, Edward A. , and I. William Zartman. 1996. Coping with conflict: A global approach. In Coping with conflict after the cold war, edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, pp. 3-34. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
39.
Larson, Deborah Welch . 1988. The psychology of reciprocity in international relations. Negotiation Journal4 (July): 281-301.
40.
Leng, Russell J. 1993. Interstate crisis behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus reciprocity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
41.
Levitt, Mary J. , Ruth A. Weber, M. Cherie Clark, and Patricia McDonnell. 1985. Reciprocity of exchange in toddler sharing behavior. Developmental Psychology21 (January): 122-123.
42.
Lipson, Charles . 1985. Bankers' dilemmas: Private cooperation in rescheduling sovereign debts. World Politics38 (October): 200-225. Reprinted in Cooperation under anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
43.
Maccoby, Eleanor E. , and John A. Martin. 1983. Socialization in the context of the family: Parent-child interaction. In Socialization, personality, and social development, edited by E. Mavis Hetherington, 1-101. Vol. 4 of Handbook of child psychology, 4th ed., edited by Paul H. Mussen. New York: Wiley.
44.
Morgan, Patrick M. 1996. The United States. In Coping with conflict after the cold war, edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, pp. 35-59. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
45.
Osgood, Charles E. 1962. An alternative to war or surrender. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
46.
Oye, Kenneth A.1985. The sterling-dollar-franc triangle: Monetary diplomacy 1929-37. World Politics38 (October): 173-199. Reprinted in Cooperation under anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
47.
Oye, Kenneth A. , ed. 1986. Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
48.
Pevehouse, Jon C. , and Joshua S. Goldstein. 1999a. Serbian compliance or defiance in Kosovo? Statistical analysis and real-time predictions. Journal of Conflict Resolution43:538-546.
49.
Pevehouse, Jon C. , and Joshua S. Goldstein. 1999b. International cooperation and regional conflicts in the post-cold war world, 1987-1999 (Study no. 2761) [computer file]. Distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.
50.
Pruitt, Dean G. 1998. Social conflict. In The handbook of social psychology, 4th ed., vol. 2, edited by Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, 470-503. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
51.
Quandt, William B. 1993. Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Rapoport, Anatol , and Albert M. Chammah (with Carol J. Orwant). 1965. Prisoner's dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
54.
Rapoport, Anatol , and Albert M. Chammah. 1969. The game of chicken. In Game theory in the behavioral sciences, edited by Ira R. Buchler and Hugo G. Nutini, pp. 151-175. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
55.
Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and insecurity. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood.
56.
Ross, Marc Howard . 1993. The culture of conflict: Interpretations and interests in comparative perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
57.
Rothchild, Donald . 1997. Managing ethnic conflict in Africa: Pressures and incentives for cooperation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
58.
Rubin, Jeffrey Z. , and Bert R. Brown. 1975. The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. New York: Academic Press.
59.
Russett, Bruce . 1983. The prisoners of insecurity: Nuclear deterrence, the arms race, and arms control. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
60.
Satloff, Robert . 1997. Target Saddam. Washington Post, 2 December.
61.
Satloff, Robert . 1998. Scuttle diplomacy. New Republic, 2 February.
62.
Schrodt, Philip A. , Shannon G. Davis, and Judith L. Weddle. 1994. Political science: KEDS—A program for machine coding events data. Social Science Computer Review12:561-588.
63.
Schrodt, Philip A. and Deborah J. Gerner. 1994. Validity assessment of a machine-coded event data set for the Middle East, 1982-1992. American Journal of Political Science38 (August): 825-854.
64.
Schrodt, Philip A. and Deborah J. Gerner. 1997. Empirical indicators of crisis phase in the Middle East, 1982-1995. Journal of Conflict Resolution41:529-552.
65.
Schrodt, Philip A. and Deborah J. Gerner. 1998. An event data set for the Arabian/Persian Gulf region, 1979-1997. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, February, in Minneapolis, MN.
66.
Silk, Joan B.1992. The patterning of intervention among male bonnet macaques: Reciprocity, revenge, and loyalty. Current Anthropology33 (June): 318-325.
67.
Sims, Christopher A.1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica48 (January):1-48.
68.
Sims, Christopher A.1987. Vectorautoregressions and reality: Comment. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics5 (October): 443-449.
69.
Snidal, Duncan . 1985. Coordination vs. prisoner's dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes. American Political Science Review79 (December): 923-942.
70.
Snyder, Glenn , and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
71.
Stein, Janice Gross . 1996. Communications, signalling, and intelligence. In Coping with conflict after the cold war, edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, pp. 247-270. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
72.
Suddarth, Roscoe . 1997. Let's not panic about Saddam. Washington Post, 8 December.
73.
Telhami, Shibley (with Lawrence Velte). 1997. The Arab-Israeli peace process: Assessing the costs of failure. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
74.
Telhami, Shibley . 1999. From Camp David to Wye: Changing assumptions in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Middle East Journal53 (Summer): 379-392.
75.
Tetlock, Philip E. 1998. Social psychology and world politics. In The handbook of social psychology, 4th ed., vol. 2, edited by Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, 868-912. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
76.
Trivers, Robert . 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology46 (March): 35-57.
77.
Wagner, R. Harrison . 1983. The theory of games and the problem of international cooperation. American Political Science Review77 (June): 330-346.
78.
Waltz, Kenneth . 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
79.
Ward, Michael Don . 1981. Seasonality, reaction, expectation, adaptation, and memory in cooperative and conflictual foreign policy behavior. International Interactions8 (3): 229-245.
80.
Webb, Michael C. , and Stephen D. Krasner. 1989. Hegemonic stability theory: An empirical assessment. Review of International Studies15 (Summer): 183-198.
81.
Williams, John T.1992. Dynamic change, specification uncertainty, and Bayesian vector autoregression analysis. Political Analysis4: 97-125.
82.
Zartman, I. William . 1976. Introduction. In The 50% solution: How to bargain successfully with hijackers, strikers, bosses, oil magnates, Arabs, Russians, and other worthy opponents in this modern world, edited by I. William Zartman, pp. 1-41. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
83.
Zartman, I. William . 1989. Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa. 2nd ed.New York: Oxford University Press.
84.
Zartman, I. William . 1997. The structuralist dilemma in negotiation. Research on Negotiation in Organizations6:227-245.
