Retributive responses play a role in human behavior. Are they triggered primarily by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions? Experimental studies were conducted of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending to and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are nonretributive altogether, in that they focus on end-state distributions independently of who brought them about.
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