Randall Stone's critique of theory of moves (TOM) is motivated by a desire to purge game theory of TOM's alleged “backsliding” and restore its superior orthodoxy. But Stone's indictment is marred by serious misunderstandings of TOM and unfortunate misconceptions about what constitutes a scientific theory and how it should be applied and tested. The author rebuts Stone's charges and briefly discusses a new area for which TOM seems especially well suited—the study of path dependence—suggesting how TOM can contribute to the understanding of when actors make seemingly irrational choices that lead to immediately worse outcomes.
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