A central goal of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1973-1982 was to establish an international order for the use of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. An overwhelming majority of countries signed the comprehensive convention, but several countries—including the industrialized G7 members Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the former West Germany—rejected the new ocean regime in 1982. This article addresses the question of why some states opposed the 1982 convention by examining their preferences for alternative decision-making rules. A policy-seeking approach is used by deriving the preferences of 149 states for different decision-making rules from three components: states' preferences for policies, the working properties of different decision-making rules, and the location of the status quo. Findings show why the 1982 proposal failed to be supported by the main industrialized countries. Some evidence exists for the successful foundation of a multicameral rule in 1994.
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