This article addresses two basic issues: (1) theoretical and methodological arguments as to why substitutability is important to the research enterprise in the study of world politics and (2) the theoretical and methodological problems in designing empirical research to demonstrate both the existence of substitutability and its impact on the choices of foreign policy tools and strategy. The first issue begins with the standard concern with substitutability: the problems that it creates for research design and how to deal with these problems. However, while these issues are important—and central to cumulation—substitutability has a broader impact on international relations theory through its relationship to opportunity and willingness and their interaction. Thus, substitutability is important in regard to the agent-structure perspective in general and particularly how it affects the choices of agents in two-level games.
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