Substituting Policies during U.S. Interventions in Internal Conflicts

Abstract

The conditions under which states substitute across a range of foreign policy options have remained largely an unexplored area of international relations. The ability to substitute policies is evident in the response by the United States to instability in other countries. In this article, the author explores the conditions under which the United States changes its intervention strategies in civil conflicts and the type of interventions that are substituted once the decision to change has been made. He argues that the decision to change policy is rooted in domestic political risks, while the specific strategy for intervening will be a function of capabilities. Using data on U.S. interventions in the post-World War II period, the author demonstrates that domestic factors are associated with the likelihood of a change from the status quo. The specific policy option chosen, however, appears to be a result of both capabilities, which are rooted in the relationship with the target country and the amount of public attention given to the conflict in the media.