Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Xenophobia in South Africa is often depicted as anti-immigrant sentiments and stereotypes that emanate from social, political, and economic misconceptions. This paper argues that though the causes of xenophobia are many and complex, they stem from the dashed hopes of independence and the legacy of apartheid. This narrative has over the years been overshadowed by the view that xenophobic attacks in South Africa are a product of hate and anti-migration. We argue that the failure of successive governments of the ANC to correct the wrongs of the apartheid past and make the economy inclusive has stoked the tensions between citizens and foreign nationals. To underscore this point, this paper undertakes a discussion on the pertinent implications of the political trajectory of xenophobia in South Africa and makes some recommendations on what can be done to reduce incidences of xenophobic attacks in the future.

Keywords

xenophobia immigrants foreign nationals independence revolution

Introduction: Xenophobia in Africa

Xenophobia is a social problem that has gripped the modern history of humanity. Across Africa, Europe and the Americas, there has been increased xenophobic rhetoric and hate crimes (Mubangizi, 2021). The migration crisis in Europe in 2015 saw a growing tide of anti-migrants in the continent, which was pushed mainly by far-right political parties. The anti-migration rhetoric of former US President Donald Trump resulted in increased hatred and hostility toward foreigners in the United States. In early 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were concerns of xenophobic discrimination in the evacuation process as people of color and foreign nationals were not prioritized and were pushed to the back of queues which would necessitate their transportation and grant them safe passage out of the country to seek asylum (IOM, 2022; UNHCR, 2022).

In Africa, xenophobic tendencies have been a recurring aspect across the continent for decades. In 1981, in former Zaire, then President, Mobutu Sese Seko repealed the 1972 presidential decree that had granted citizenship to Rwandan and Burundian immigrants (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004). This was a response to simmering tensions and a rising national resentment against immigrants. Immigrants were perceived as competitors for available economic resources, especially land (Mutanda, 2022). The Mobutu regime manipulated these feelings of resentment and stoked anti-foreigner rhetoric to embark on ethnic cleansing in North Kivu in 1993 and tried to eject Congolese Tutsis in 1996 (Kersting, 2009). In Gabon, Gabonese citizens displayed a reserved attitude toward foreigners especially those of African descent. Capitalizing on this national sentiment, President Omar Bongo (1967−2009) promoted what he called Gabonese national identity and citizenship (Mutanda, 2022). Gray (1998) further noted that “in Gabon citizenship has been reinforced and more deeply embedded in the populace through a series of violent attacks on various foreign populations beginning in 1962 and continuing into the 1990s.” Omar Bongo encouraged these violent attacks and mass expulsions of foreign immigrants to build up a Gabonese nation-state and in the process deflect attention from mounting domestic problems (Kersting, 2009).

Though xenophobia is a global challenge, the focus of this paper is on South Africa, a country that has been in the throes of xenophobic hostilities since independence. This article seeks to give a relatively new dimension to the narrative of xenophobia in South Africa and argues that xenophobia is informed by unfulfilled independence expectations and the legacy of the apartheid era. It is therefore a departure from the common narrative that posits that xenophobic violence is inspired by hate and anti-migrant attitudes of South African citizens. It uses qualitative data gathered from published journals, reports by NGOs, excerpts from political figures, and print media articles to construct a perception of foreigners and how this has contributed to recurrent attacks on African immigrants in South Africa. The central question that this study contended with was: What has been the contribution of dashed hopes of political independence and the legacy of apartheid to the current problem of xenophobic violence in South Africa? This led us to other questions including why is the violence against African immigrants confined to the townships where the majority of poor South Africans reside? And what could be the solution to this perennial challenge?

The current section is the introduction, and it lays the foundation of the study and provides the background to the study. The second section provides the theoretical underpinnings of the study and is followed by a section that examines the dynamics of xenophobic violence in South Africa. This is followed by a section that examines how the legacy of apartheid has stoked xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. This is followed by a section that argues that the failure of the independence project to economically emancipate and embrace the majority of South Africans has influenced the way citizens frame the narratives about African immigrants and has resulted in violence. The final section summarizes the article’s major findings and provides recommendations.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The word xenophobia is a derivate of two Greek words, “xeno” which means stranger and “phobia” which means fear (Akinola, 2017; Masenya, 2017). So put together, xenophobia means the fear of strangers and this of late has now included the hatred and violent hostility of refugees and migrant people (Field, 2017). Cutanda et al. (2015, p. 802) are of the view that the definition of this term has been dominated by denialism and debate, but xenophobia denotes hostility towards the stranger perceived as a threat. Burlacu (2017, p. 89) and Akinola (2017, p. 9471) posit that in a broader sense xenophobia encompasses “attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that rejects, excludes and vilify its targets on the belief that they are perpetual outsiders” who should be excluded from the social system. It is important to note that the common denominator is the rejection and exclusion of one group by the other for different reasons.

It is difficult to have a linear construction of the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa because the subject is multifaceted and has many dimensions. So, defining xenophobia as a discourse and practice of hostility and discrimination against foreign nationals is simplistic and inadequate (Landau, 2011). This is because there have been many South African nationals who have been subjected to xenophobic violence because of their linguistic orientation or physical appearance (Greenburg, 2010; Hassim et al., 2008; Polzer, 2010). There were cases of people of Pedi and Venda extraction who were attacked because they were perceived as foreign nationals owing to their physical appearance (Masikane et al., 2020). With South Africa’s many languages, some of which are least known, speakers of such languages are sometimes identified as foreign immigrants, especially in metropolitan cities like Johannesburg and Durban (Landau & Misago, 2009). This is because xenophobia originates from the thinking that one who is not like us is foreign or is an outsider (Kaluba, 2016; Soyombo, 2008).

This article explains xenophobia through the hypotheses proposed by Harris (2002) of scapegoating and isolation. The scapegoating thesis situates xenophobia within the context of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation and the high expectations associated with this transition. The heightened expectations of many South Africans of reduced poverty, and equal distribution of wealth and resources resulted in disillusionment when these expectations were not realized (Botha, 2012). So according to the scapegoating hypothesis, hostility toward foreigners is explained in relation to dashed expectations of the independence project. The economic turmoil has created conducive circumstances for xenophobia to prosper and for citizens to find scapegoats to blame for their economic deprivation (Tella & Ogunnibi, 2014). So, in South Africa, xenophobia is conceptualized in terms of people’s frustration and relative deprivation (Masikane et al., 2020). The scapegoating theory posits that the weak and vulnerable groups are targeted and blamed by the powerful groups for all the ills that bedevil society (Tella & Ogunnibi, 2014). In this case, black South Africans blame immigrants of African descent for all the social ills and economic malaise, which include unemployment, vandalism of infrastructure, the spread of diseases, and general crime (Masikane et al., 2020). Scapegoating becomes convenient when the original target could not be accessed, in this case which is the governing ANC and its political elites (Tella & Ogunnibi, 2014).

Moreover, the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa is also explained by the isolation theory. This theory emerged from the isolationist policy of the apartheid regime of South Africa. The regime sealed the borders of the country, and South Africans had no or limited interaction with the outside world. With the coming of independence and the opening of the country’s borders, South Africans found differences in national identity to be threatening and dangerous (Morris, 1998). So according to the isolation theory, xenophobia in South Africa is a result of the isolationist policy of the apartheid past which cut South Africa from the rest of the world (Duncan, 2012).

Dynamics of Xenophobia in South Africa

Xenophobia in South Africa came under the international spotlight in 2008. In May 2008, international media was inundated by graphic images of savage attacks on African immigrants living in South Africa. Scenes of knife-wielding attackers, wounded victims, burning houses, and the most horrific photographs of a burning man were shown around the world (Dodson, 2010). The image of the Mozambican who was burnt alive became the most widely circulated image of the violence. This left 62 people dead and approximately over a hundred thousand displaced and homeless (Crush, 2008; Steinberg, 2012). The phenomenon of xenophobia goes beyond 2008 and has remained a permanent feature dominating debates on migration in South Africa. Operation “Buyelekhaya” (go back home) subjected immigrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi to savage attacks in some parts of South Africa over a period of several weeks in January of 1994 (Chakale et al., 2019). This was a clampdown by South Africans against foreigners purportedly bent on ridding the South African townships of all foreign nationals. Over the years, there has been a spate of anti-foreigner attacks that have occurred across South African cities and townships targeting Malawians, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese, Nigerians, and Somalians. Apart from the general attacks on foreign nationals in recent years across South African communities, the prominent ones are the 2013 attacks against Somali entrepreneurs in Pretoria and Port Elizabeth, the 2015 violence against foreign nationals that started in Durban, the 2015 attacks in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape and the Pretoria riots of 2016 (Chakale et al., 2019; Tella, 2016).

In September 2019—shortly before South Africa assumed the Chair of the African Union—sporadic riots erupted in Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and surrounding areas. These riots morphed into xenophobic violence targeting immigrants. The attacks left approximately 12 people dead, thousands displaced, and businesses and property wantonly destroyed and looted (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This according to the Human Rights Watch’s report came in the wake of similar xenophobic violence against African foreign nationals and their businesses in March 2019 in Durban (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Following these attacks, hundreds of affected immigrants sought refuge at police stations leaving their homes and businesses to be looted or destroyed. Moreover, an estimated 200 people have been killed by xenophobic-related violence since March 2018. Many of the victims are foreign truck drivers who have been subjected to gasoline bombs, gun violence, stoning, and stabbing to force them out of the trucking industry (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The attacks were led by people who claimed affiliation with the All-Truck Drivers Foundation (ATDF), an association of South African truck drivers. The backlash for the 2019 xenophobic related violence from across the continent was strong that even the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a statement condemning the violence (Lalbahadur, 2020). To contain a potential diplomatic fallout, South Africa for the first time dispatched a special envoy to some of Africa’s capitals to mend relations.

To combat violence against foreign nationals, the government of South Africa launched the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (NAP) in 2019. Despite having this mechanism in place, South Africa continued to experience incidents of xenophobic violence and discrimination against non-nationals. This is a sign of a deep-seated problem that cannot be wished away but needs systemic structural transformation that addresses the socio-economic challenges gripping much of South African society. It is also important to note that the anti-foreigner frenzy and violence targeting immigrants have become more frequent and louder in the last decade or so. It is no coincidence that in the last decade, the South African economy has been declining and economic growth has been suppressed. Soaring unemployment has been the hallmark of the economic challenges South Africa is facing. According to Statistics South Africa’s unemployment rate sits at 35.5%, which some analysts regard as a very conservative figure, and they peg the rate of unemployment to be as high as 46.6%. Unemployment among South Africans has been generally blamed on immigrants who are reportedly grabbing jobs meant for South Africans. Pressure groups like Operation Dudula and Put South Africa First have been formed with the intention of fighting for the ejection of immigrants from South Africa. Operation Dudula has been combative and has attributed the rising rates of murders, drug trafficking, and armed robberies to the rising number of illegal immigrants in South Africa.

The year 1994 was a watershed year in the history of South Africa. Not only did it usher in a new political dispensation, but it also created new expectations and prospects for a better life for people who had known oppression, poverty, and hopelessness for a long time. The euphoria for a better life was short-lived as the envisaged economic opportunities did not materialize and unemployment and poverty became the order of the day. The social challenges of unemployment and poverty bred another social ill of crime as townships became hotbeds of crime. Unemployment steadily increased from 1994 onwards. Stats South Africa recorded 8.9 million people who were unemployed in 1994 which translated to an unemployment rate of 20%; a figure which shot up to 28.5% in 2018 (Banerjee et al., 2007). By the end of 2019, the rate of unemployment had risen to 29.1% and was 35.4% in the fourth quarter of 2019 (Maluleke, 2020) and eased to 32.7% in the fourth quarter of 2022. This is happening at a time when the South African economy is not growing fast enough to absorb all the job seekers who are entering the labor market. The competition for jobs fueled tensions and the perception that jobs are scarce because they are being taken by immigrants grew. Closely linked to this is the perception that employers prefer immigrants because they accept lower wages thereby undermining the prospects of South Africans being hired and the struggle for higher wages.

Another thing stoking the fires of xenophobia in South Africa is the perception by South Africans that immigrants infringe on their socioeconomic rights. Services such as housing, education, health, and social welfare are said to be strained because they are overburdened. Issues of poor service delivery in South Africa are well documented. The country has one of the highest cases of service delivery protests in the world. Out of all this comes the perception that immigrants place an inordinate burden on social services thereby depriving deserving citizens of the right to access these services (Mubangizi, 2021). Indeed, one of the social ills that has reached alarming levels in South Africa is crime. According to Stats SA (2019), in 2018/2019 there were 260,000 incidences of home robberies, 83,000 incidences of car theft, 12,000 murders, 500,000 incidents of assault, 1,2 million incidences of theft of personal property, and about 580,000 incidences of street robbery, among other crimes. Add to this incidence of abductions, theft, and vandalism of infrastructure, domestic violence, and gender-based violence; South Africa becomes a hotbed of crime. For these crimes, immigrants have carried the heaviest share of the blame as there is widespread scapegoating of immigrants for the crimes by South Africans. The blame of foreigners for criminal activities has not only been made by ordinary citizens but has found its way into political leadership and the police. A study by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in 2001 found that police often associate crime with undocumented immigrants (Harris et al., 2001). Such actions have often fueled xenophobic attitudes, the study concluded. Not only that, perpetrators of heinous crimes such as murder, armed robberies, and rape are often profiled according to their nationalities by the police. Names of such and their nationalities are released or leaked to the mainstream and social media platforms. This has resulted in crime being viewed through the lens of nationality in South Africa.

Of all the factors that have been identified as responsible for informing xenophobic attitudes in South Africa, poverty and inequality stand out as the most prominent. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) carried out a study in 2008 and this study confirmed that poverty exacerbates tensions between South Africans and immigrants (Pillay et al., 2008). This study does not address the root of poverty among the many black South Africans. Mubangizi (2021) argues that issues of livelihood in informal settlements present fertile ground for tensions. According to the HSRC’s study “multiple tensions arise where the poorest of the poor are competing for resources and trying to survive in an uncertain economic environment as food prices spiral and employment possibilities are extremely insecure” (Pillay et al., 2008). Further, the study established that there was a strong perception in the informal settlement to the effect that immigrants were stealing jobs meant for South Africans (Pillay et al., 2008). This was because the immigrants were ready to accept lower wages and hence were preferred by employers over local citizens. It is no coincidence therefore that all the xenophobic violence started and was concentrated in the townships and the informal settlements. The level of poverty and the degree of inequality that grip South Africa is seen in these areas. It is important to note that many people, especially blacks did not become poor after independence, but this is a legacy of the colonial past.

Locating South African Institutions Within the Xenophobic Tide

Within its multifaceted nature, xenophobia in South Africa is also embedded within social structures and institutions such as the media and different government ministries. Research on the experiences of refugee women in accessing public institutions (Department of Home Affairs, The South African Police Service, and Public Hospitals), established that xenophobia is embedded in these government institutions in country (Dahlberg and Thapar-Björkert, 2023). In a separate study exploring portrayal of foreigners in the media, Nkala and Masuku (2023b) observed that foreigners are oftentimes portrayed in a bad light which dehumanizes them. It is of essence to be cognizant that media has potential to shape public opinion through exaggerating existing biases, and this is true in the context of xenophobia (Nkala & Masuku, 2023b; Tarisayi & Manik, 2020). Empirical evidence shows that through dehumanizing language, potential victims are portrayed in nonhuman frames thus such dehumanizing discourses can pave way for violence to occur (Fischer & O’Mara, 2023; Luft, 2019; Smith, 2016; Rai et al., 2017). In addition, the use of alarmist language in reporting the size of the African immigrant population has been a norm¹ in South African media, with the reporters normally writing without making any reference to academic or other credible research/national statistics (Nkala & Masuku, 2023b). The impact of such negative portrayal of immigrants adds to the list of causal attributions for xenophobia in South Africa.

Government ministries, mostly represented by top government officials, have usually adopted a loose use of labels such as “undocumented” or “illegal” to refer to immigrants (Akinola, 2017; Tewolde, 2023). Of significance is to note that, such a portrayal of immigrants without real evidence has been a vehicle necessitating “political opportunism.” As Pierce et al. (2022) note, reliance on information and science as a basis of debate inherently limits the extent to which politically expedient tactics of emotional manipulation and disinformation can be used to garner support from a constituency, hence political opportunists usually rely on misinformation. This could explain why the media and politicians do not use academic or credible evidence to support their claims of immigrant crimes and diseases in South Africa. To some extent, the media’s deference to government perpetuates the scapegoating of immigrants as being responsible for the problems facing the country (Nkala & Masuku, 2023a). Analyzing the relationship between the State and media in South Africa, and their roles in shaping xenophobic narratives reveals the systemic ways in which the tendency is institutionalized.

Politicians as an influential stratum of the South African society have capitalized on xenophobic sentiments to gain support from certain segments of the population. Out of curious reasonability, one is bound to wonder why they would do that. Empirical evidence on political opportunism shows that use of divisive rhetoric is usually associated with distracting populations from other pressing issues, as well as consolidating voter bases in most scenarios (Pierce et al., 2022). This is true for South Africa where the independence project has failed the people and hence politicians use the convenience of anxieties of South African citizens to redirect attention to African immigrants. For example, the former Health Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi was once quoted saying “The weight that foreign nationals are bringing to the country has got nothing to do with xenophobia . . . it’s a reality. Our hospitals are full, we can’t control them” (Heleta, 2018; Mbhele, 2018). While politicians may be well meaning, with their sentiments being a somewhat true reflection of the reality on the ground, it is important to note that their voices become drivers for xenophobia. As Akinola (2017) observes, symbolic violence is more pervasive and difficult to identify as it usually hides behind freedom of speech and other democratic tendencies. Again, in the case of South Africa, immigrants are not the sole cause for poor performance of the health sector considering that mismanagement of state resources and funds, corruption and underfunding of the sector have been identified as contributory factors (Ncala, 2019; Vanyoro, 2022).

Indeed, xenophobia in South Africa can thus to be viewed as a social structural creation, basing on Akinola (2017) argument that “nothing is pervasive and illusive in the perpetration of xenophobic violence as the role played by the system, and the complicit stance of the judiciary which is used to protect the strong from the weak than the vice versa” (Akinola, 2017, p. 141). As concretized by Olofinbiyi (2022), the erratic escalation of xenophobia in South Africa is largely subject to government’s denial and pretext to deter the cause among its citizens.

The Legacy of Apartheid: Exclusion and Isolation

The theories outlined above help in some way to explain the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. Through these theories, this article attempts to provide a new dimension to the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa. As the isolationist theory asserts, the genesis of xenophobia in South Africa can be traced to the apartheid colonial state. South Africa was under apartheid rule from 1948 to 1994, characterized by racial segregation and economic subjugation of the black population. The apartheid system forestalled non-white immigration by creating an inhospitable environment for Africans and refusing to grant legal permission for their movement (Klotz, 2000). Apartheid was a system that was built on divide-and-rule tactics whose end game was to divide black people by instilling mistrust, hatred, and hostility (Mubangizi, 2021). Apartheid-era migration was controlled and informed by providing cheap labor to the country’s industries. Restrictive pass laws were in place to control the flow of internal migration. According to Minga (2015), the discourse of xenophobia has historical roots in the governance system which was established to entrench discrimination against blacks and protect the privileges of the white minority. It is this policy of divide and rule that resulted in the imposition of “separation of groups; the practice of keeping ethnic, racial, religious, or gender groups separate” (Minga, 2015). It is argued that it is through this system that hatred and fear of others were inculcated in the psyche of black South Africans (Mubangizi, 2021).

Besides the internal isolationist policy of the apartheid regime, the regime also sealed South Africa’s borders in the process shutting the country from the international community. However, the end of apartheid and the coming of independence in 1994 ended South Africa’s fortified borders. The country’s borders were opened and many people especially from across the African continent streamed into South Africa in pursuit of economic opportunities. This massive migration into South Africa was possibly triggered by the strong economy and industrial base of South Africa which provided economic opportunities to immigrants. The coming of independence, however, did not solve deep-seated social inequality which was one of the by-products of apartheid. So, the influx of foreign immigrants happened in an environment where most citizens were contending with poverty, hunger, and unemployment and these bred strong resentment and bitterness. According to Mubangizi (2021), the bitterness was turned in the direction of the foreign immigrants in the form of hostility and violence. A survey conducted in 2013 by Carol Adjai and Gabriella Lazaridis uncovered that xenophobic sentiments revolve around the politics of access to socio-economic resources and these play an important role in increasing xenophobic tendencies (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013). It is submitted that a key issue in this matrix of socioeconomic factors is unemployment.

The legacy of apartheid is still alive in South Africa and continues to impact the lives of black South Africans. The apartheid era cultivated a culture of violence as the regime created a hostile environment for immigrants (Hicks, 1999). Moreover, the legacy of apartheid created a hierarchy in society which had white South Africans at the helm as superiors, black South Africans in the middle and black foreigners as the inferior, while Coloureds and Indians were not part of the hierarchy (Nyamnjoh, 2010). According to the Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, the South African government indicated that the scars of colonialism and apartheid were still visible in the form of poverty and underdevelopment in the black communities (Republic of South Africa, 2019). This was noted by the International Labour Organization that apartheid policies on mobility have entrenched negative attitudes toward African workers among a range of South African institutions (OECD & International Labour Organization, 2018). Okyere-Manu confirms that the brutality meted out to fellow human beings during episodes of xenophobia in South Africa can be explained through the legacy of apartheid that historically suppressed the black population through systematic violence and intimidation and this sowed seeds of anger and hatred among the people (Okyere-Manu, 2016).

The South African Independence: A Revolution that Never Was

This sub-section discusses how the independence project lost its way in South Africa and the consequent domestic challenges South Africa has faced. These domestic challenges have been exploited by various groups including politicians to attack foreigners. The rise of xenophobia in many parts of the world has been linked to competition for scarce resources (Nagar & Saunders, 2010). In South Africa, there is a clear correlation between service delivery protests and incidences of xenophobic violence (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022). Foreign nationals have been blamed for South Africa’s persistent socio-economic problems such as high crime, the spread of diseases, the lack of jobs, and the dilapidation of local authority services (Kudrat, 2018). Violence against foreign nationals should be understood and interpreted within the framework of historical, social, political, and economic settings which exist in the country. One of the distinctive features of the failure of the independence project is the mushrooming of informal settlements which Myambo claims that are distinctly a “new South African problem” (Myambo, 2011). Despite the ANC government’s promise to provide housing, the sprawling shanty towns are mushrooming across South Africa’s urban areas. The provision of shelter is one area which the ANC government said is a basic human right that they have promised to provide to its citizens. Through the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), the South African government has subsided housing for its citizens. It has delivered an estimated three million housing units in the past 29 years. However, the influx of people into urban areas has rapidly increased while housing has remained stagnant. This has resulted in an estimated backlog of 900,000 housing units. This has stoked anger from what people perceive as unfulfilled promises by politicians. Unemployed and low-income earners, who have applied for and not received a house are questioning the credibility of the government’s promises of free housing. This is why the xenophobic violence has been concentrated primarily in townships and poor large settlements in metro cities. These areas are inhabited by people who migrated to urban areas in search of livelihood (Myambo, 2011). That they find themselves living in informal settlements is an indication that they have failed to get the life they anticipated. This has put the ANC’s promise to deliver housing and a better life for all into question. This means that despite the promises made to the people about the provision of housing, South Africa still faces the problems of severe inadequacy in housing and settlement. This has resulted in the sprawling of shantytowns known as squatter camps or informal settlements which have become a distinct feature of South African urban areas. The informal settlements are indicative of economic inequality, housing failures, corruption, and maladministration, especially at the local authority level.

The presence of foreigners has been cited as a reason for the failure by the South African government to fulfil its promises of economic and social reform for its citizens. While it is credible to argue that African immigrants have put some strain on South Africa’s resources,² to solely blame foreigners for the problems currently gripping South Africa is missing the point. It must be observed that the postcolonial state in Africa has faced many challenges which are linked to the legacy of colonialism. In this regard, South Africa is no exception. The current socio-political system in South Africa and almost all African countries is a legacy of the colonial system (Austin, 2010). Economies which were meant to serve the minority white population had to be opened to serve the majority black upon attaining independence. Moreover, the notion of ethnicity left behind by the colonial masters has had an adverse impact on the social cohesion of many states in Africa. The ethnic division was amplified during the colonial era, and this set persistent rivalry and conflict in the independence era. The fragmentation of ethnic identities into several states has resulted in difficulties in managing African diversity (Reilly, 2000).

Post-apartheid South Africa was a dream for many South Africans. The hopes were centered on economic freedom and social disentanglement from the limitations of being identified as black and the ability of the blacks to witness, exercise, and taste upward social mobility. Goodman (2017) observes that South Africa claims a momentous achievement in the history of civil rights through its destruction of apartheid and creation of a democracy, even though black 75% of South Africans (55 million) still believe that they need political liberation in order to gain access to broad material gains. In the 1960s, Frantz Fanon had cautioned against such a type of independence that is symbolized by flags but not much ecopolitical transformation. Fanon labelled these types of independence to be “pseudo” or “flag independence” which changes nothing in the way local people’s lives are transformed toward dignity (Fanon & Gibson, 2016; More, 2011). Research by Tshaka (2016) shows that the general dissatisfaction with the liberation project is associated with the current bitterness and malice exhibited by South Africans. Tshaka (2016) thus concludes that the anger is a result of unfulfilled hopes for freedoms that blacks always dreamt had, but unfortunately still have to face the depressing reality where these remain unfulfilled for the majority.

There is widespread literature (More, 2011; Webster & Adler, 1999; Wyk, 2009) that portrays the situation in South Africa as being synonymous with “the independence as being a struggle that was betrayed.” An irresistible question to ask is “who betrayed the struggle, and why did they betray it.” While this question cannot be comprehensively answered in this paper, we give a quick synopsis of the different forces that slowed-downed the drive to nationalize and indigenize industries and the economy. Wyk (2009) theorizes that globalization challenged the ANC’s efforts to implement its policies as the forces and actors of globalization limited the States’s ability to implement its economic policies autonomously (Wyk, 2009, p. 25). This presented a dilemma between attracting foreign direct investment, being internationally competitive, and delivering the social goods to dismantle the socioeconomic effects of apartheid. Mimiko (2021) notes that the ensuing policy underscored the need to move carefully in relation to economic organization, in a manner that would not scare the white (capitalists), who alone were in a position to make needed investments, and thus create the jobs which the country desperately needed (Mimiko, 2021, p. 12).

Deeper analysis however shows that political motives of elites and a change in political ideologies, from a pro-nationalist stance to a more lukewarm approach underpinned by notions of “working together” signalled loss of the momentum for transformation. The betrayal of the revolution is thus partly rooted in the foundations of the formation of the rainbow nation. More (2011) notes that within 2 weeks, Mandela and the ANC revoked and abandoned the main principles of the movement which stressed the need to nationalize land and all industries in alignment with the doctrines enshrined in the Freedom Charter of 1955. While global forces could have been a factor in slowing down the independence project, research by Wyk (2009) illuminates that upon ascending to power, ANC elites strengthened their prior interactions, coalitions, and relationships with elites from white capital, which Webster and Adler (1999) conclude was intentioned on reaching a “class compromise.” The class compromise was characterized by negotiating and forming formal and informal coalitions, which produced policy frameworks and, ultimately social goods for democratic South Africa. Michie and Padayachee (1998) report that while the compromises made by ANC were important toward achieving the ecopolitical goals of the time, they closed the wiggle room for ANC’s economic policy options.

Goodman (2017) argues that apartheid basically continued in economic form, and this is supported by Anna (2019) who draws a comparison between the lives lived by whites in South Africa and the blacks. Anna (2019) observes that the majority of the 56 million black South Africans still live in areas that are characterized by the lack of basic services such as malfunctioning toilets whereas whites still enjoy most of the wealth and private levers of power, with blacks hired to trim their lawns and clean their homes. The frustration faced by South Africans is correlated to being in the same state (trimming the lawns and cleaning the home of white South Africans) which resonates with a well and alive state of apartheid. Mosala et al. (2019) hold the view that despite the principles enshrined in NDR and Freedom Charter which underpins South Africa’s policy and legal frameworks, the country remains deeply divided from a revolutionary worldview and economic sense, and this continues to produce unprecedented levels of anger and social upheaval. Mosala et al. (2019) add that although signs of ANC’s policy incoherency started several years ago, formal policymaking continues to be less of a priority with attention gobbled by altercations between ANC and its Alliance partners, a severely compromised economy, and a seemingly unstoppable tidal wave of angry, unemployed youth (Mosala et al., 2019).

The promise of land redistribution remains a long-delayed promise. In a discussion paper titled “From Freedom Charter to Cautious Land Reform—The Politics of Land in South Africa,” Anseeuw and Alden (2011) argue that the fading motivation to pursue land redistribution by the ANC government shows bad faith toward the declarations made in the Freedom charter where land redistribution was presented as not only a decisive element of South Africa’s ideological transition but was identified as one of the conditions in the political, economic and social stabilization of the country. South Africa’s present leaders, who espoused the nationalization of land in the Freedom Charter during the liberation struggle, are presently supporting a cautious approach regarding land reform (Anseeuw & Alden, 2011). Cousins adds to this multidimensional analysis and identifies that the objectives and strategic thrust of land reform remains unclear since the process has been captured by large-scale farmers, agribusiness corporates, black capitalist farmers, and political elites who aggrandize at the expense of the poor (Cousins, 2017). As exposed by literature, the promises of the Freedom Charter remain inked on paper and have not translated into reality, especially for the citizens at large together with the ethos of the National Democratic Revolution which was meant to eliminate poverty; redistribute wealth which was formerly concentrated in the hands of the few; address inequality. The consequence has been that the same policy goals of the Charter, remain unfulfilled seen in how the inequalities and poverty have amplified during the post-independence era.

Discussing the politics of freedom and the dilemma facing post-independence South Africa needs one to understand that efforts have been made by the government. For example, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) are mainstay policies that continue to advance the ideals of equality. RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework which sought to mobilize all the people in South Africa and the country’s resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist future (African National Congress, 1994; Corder, 1997; Moolla et al., 2011; Webster & Adler, 1999). Corder (1997) concluded that one in five black urban participants in his study believed that they had benefited from RDP with 46% of participants indicating that their perceived future benefit should be housing whereas 52% indicated employment. Melzer and Garbers (2019) concluded that through RDP, 3.2 million had been built from 1994 to 2018. However qualitative studies measuring the satisfaction of South Africans with the RDP housing units indicate that despite quantitative (number of houses built under RDP) there are profound criticisms regarding the inferior building standards and quality of housing units, as well as the lack of services and amenities in the RDP houses (Moolla et al., 2011; Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2017). Despite these strategic and intentional approaches taken by the government, there have been loopholes and boundaries that the South African government has failed to navigate, which is to regulate the insatiate need by politicians and their cronies to self-aggrandize. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that the anger felt by South African citizens is valid, and this in oftentimes morphed into xenophobic violence. It is clear that whites still control the economy and the majority blacks continue to struggle almost 30 years after independence. As noted by the scapegoating theory, the anger for this frustration is directed toward an easy target, the black migrants. Mimiko (2021) black South Africans still have reverence toward the whites which serves as enough bulwark compared to black African immigrants.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The xenophobic challenge in South Africa can be explained from many dimensions but a political dimension summarizes the many concepts around the frustration, anger and disappointment that fuel the xenophobic furnace. The failure to deliver the promises of the Freedom Charter, the stalling of the land redistribution, the continuity of the apartheid framework in a different form, and the failure of the ANC government to ensure social mobility/transition in a process that undoes the Sandton—Alexandra complex brews anger. This study makes the following recommendations to ease the fires of xenophobia in South Africa. The government of South Africa should formulate immigration laws that protect black foreigners in the country to end black-on-black racism. Through enacting laws, the government takes responsibility and shows political commitment and leadership in dissuading attacks. Structural xenophobia³ should be dismantled. This can be done through a change in language, discourse, and conduct by those in political and justice departments, especially the police. Literature shows that the denigration and labelling of foreigners is also prevalent and evident amongst those in the police force and officials in charge of immigration and other government agencies which set a ground for citizens to act negligently under the belief that they can get away with crime. Moreover, the South African economy has largely remained in the hands of the minority, especially whites. This has deepened socio-economic inequalities. To get rid of this, the economy should be decolonized to give a greater chance to blacks to have opportunities to start businesses and stand a chance to have a voice in how the economy of South Africa is run. This will ease the sense of scramble and hopelessness amongst black South Africans. Xenophobia should be acknowledged as a serious problem facing South Africa. The media should take a deliberate stance to educate South Africans about regionalism and the need to respect immigrants as far as human dignity is concerned. To some point xenophobia cannot be divorced from the regional discussion, it happens in South Africa, but what causes the influx of immigrants in South Africa also needs to be considered. There is a need for the African Union to prioritize creating a conducive migration environment based on the ethos of Ubuntu (/I am because we are/being self through others).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Edwin Yingi

Notes

Author Biographies

Edwin Yingi is a postdoctoral researcher currently based at the University of South Africa in the Department of Political Science. He is a governance scholar who specialises in public governance, democracy, peace and security in Africa. He examines these themes using the lens of conflict and security as organising frameworks.

Tomy Ncube is a postgraduate researcher interested in sustainable and community development. Based on interdisciplinary, Tom endeavours to connect knowledge from the disaster management field with that of international development using political science lens. He has five years working in social protection programming and six years as an independent researcher.

Everisto Benyera is an Associate Professor of African politics in the department of political science-University of South Africa. Everisto researches transitology, transitional justice, decoloniality and indegenous peacebuilding, healing and reconciliation mechanisms. He has to date published two books, 18 book chapters and 13 journal articles.

References

Adjai

Lazaridis

(2013). Migration, xenophobia and new racism in post-apartheid South Africa. International Journal of Social Science Studies, 1, 192.

African National Congress. (1994). The reconstruction and development programme. Umanyano Publishers.

Akinola

A. O.

(2017). The political economy of xenophobia in Africa. Springer International Publishing.

Anna

(2019, May 7). Post-apartheid South Africa is world’s most unequal country. AP News.

Anseeuw

Alden

(2011). From freedom charter to cautious land reform—the politics of land in South Africa. Afrique du Sud, University of Pretoria.

Austin

(2010). African economic development and colonial legacies. International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 1, 11–32.

Banerjee

Galiani

Levinsohn

Mclaren

Woolard

(2007). Why has unemployment risen in the New South Africa. NBER working paper series. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Botha

J. R.

(2012). Xenophobia conflicted in the De Doorns: A developmental communication challenge for developmental local government (master of philosophy). Department of Journalism, Stellenbosch University.

Burlacu

(2017). Re-examining a theoretical framework for researching xenophobia in post-communist Romania. Bulletin of theTransilvania University of Braşov, 10, 89–98.

10.

Chakale

M. V.

Marumo

P. O.

Mothelesi

(2019). Xenophobia attack and development: A discourse in South Africa. African Renaissance, 2019, 185–198.

11.

Corder

C. K.

(1997). The reconstruction and development programme: Success or failure? In Møller

(Ed.) Quality of life in South Africa. Springer, 183–203.

12.

Cousins

(2017). Land reform in South Africa is failing. Can it be saved? Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 92, 135–157.

13.

Crush

(2008). The perfect storm: The realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. Migration Policy Series, 50, 1–61.

14.

Cutanda

M. S.-M.

Licata

Wright

J. D.

(2015). Xenophobia: Social psychological aspects International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 25, 802–807.

15.

Dahlberg

Thapar-Björkert

(2023). Conceptualizing xenophobia as structural violence in the lives of refugee women in Gauteng, South Africa. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 46, 2768–2790.

16.

Dodson

B. J.

(2010). Locating xenophobia: Debate, discourse, and everyday experience in Cape Town, South Africa. Africa Today, 56, 2–22.

17.

Duncan

(2012). Reaping the whirlwind: Xenophobic violence in South Africa. Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, 3, 255–271.

18.

Fanon

Gibson

(2016). Living fanon: Global perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.

19.

Field

(2017). Re-imagining the church in the context of migration and xenophobia. Verbum et Ecclesia, 38, 1–8.

20.

Fischer

O’Mara

S. M.

(2023). “They deserve it for what they’re doing”: Dehumanising rhetoric as a facilitator of the recourse to violence against the defenceless. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 51, 101280.

21.

Goodman

S. P.

(2017, Friday 24). End of apartheid in South Africa? Not in economic terms. New York Times.

22.

Gray

C. J.

(1998). Cultivating citizenship through xenophobia in Gabon, 1960–1995. Africa Today, 45, 389–409.

23.

Greenburg

(2010). The spatial politics of xenophobia: Everyday practices of Congolese migrants in Johannesburg. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 74, 66–68.

24.

Harris

(2001). A foreign experience: Violence, crime and xenophobia during South Africa’s transition. CSVR.

25.

Harris

(2002). Xenophobia: A new pathology for a New South Africa? In Hook

Eagle

(Eds.), Psychopathology and social prejudice. University of Cape Town Press, 169–184.

26.

Hassim

Kupe

Worby

Skuy

(2008). Go home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and the reinvention of difference in South Africa. Wits University Press.

27.

Heleta

(2018, November 20). Are foreigners stealing your jobs and healthcare? Find out. Mail & Gurdian.

28.

Hicks

T. F.

(1999). The constitution, aliens control act, and xenophobia: The struggle to protect South Africa’s pariah—the undocumented immigrant. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 339, 393–417.

29.

Human Rights Watch. (2020). South Africa: Events of 2019. Retrieved July 20, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-africa

30.

IOM. (2022). Discrimination and racism against third country nationals fleeing Ukraine must end: IOM director general. IOM—UN Migration.

31.

Kaluba

(2016, April 23). Zambia: Tackling xenophobia in Zambia. Times of Zambia.

32.

Kersting

(2009). New nationalism and xenophobia in Africa: A new inclination? Africa Spectrum, 44, 7–18.

33.

Klotz

(2000). Migration after apartheid: Deracialising South African foreign policy. Third World Quarterly, 21, 831–847.

34.

Kudrat

(2018). The rights of vulnerable and marginalized groups in South Africa. Centre For Conflict Resolution.

35.

Lalbahadur

(2020). COVID-19’s impact on South Africa’s relations with Africa. Policy Briefings—South African Institute of International Affairs, 213, 1–11.

36.

Landau

B. L.

(2011). Exorcising the demons within: Xenophobia, violence, and statecraft in contemporary South Africa. Wits University Press.

37.

Landau

L. B.

Misago

J. P.

(2009). Who to blame and what’s to gain? Reflections on space, state, and violence in Kenya and South Africa. Africa Spectrum, 44, 99–100.

38.

Luft

(2019). Normalization of violence: It’s not what you think. Social Science Research Council. Retrieved August 31, 2023, from https://items.ssrc.org/insights/dehumanization-and-the-normalization-of-violence-its-not-what-you-think/

39.

Maluleke

(2020). Quarterly labour force survey Q4:2019. Statistics South Africa.

40.

Masenya

J. M.

(2017). Afrophobia in South Africa: A general perspective of xenophobia. University of Limpopo.

41.

Masikane

C. M.

Hewitt

M. L.

Toendepi

(2020). Dynamics informing xenophobia and leadership response in South Africa. Acta Commercii, 20, 1–11.

42.

Mbhele

(2018, November 14). Foreign nationals are burdening SA health system: Motsoaledi. SABC News.

43.

Melzer

Garbers

(2019). From counting houses, to making houses count: Publicly available administrative data on subsidised housing. Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa.

44.

Michie

Padayachee

(1998). Three years after apartheid: Growth, employment and redistribution? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, 623–636.

45.

Mimiko

O. F.

(2021). Xenophobia as bogeyman: The post-apartheid state in South Africa and challenges of development and regional engagement for Nigeria. Monograph Nigerian Political Science Association, 1, 1–45.

46.

Minga

K. J.

(2015). Xenophobia in literature and film as a re-claim of space and re-make of apartheid. Global Media Journal—African Edition, 9, 268–297.

47.

Moolla

Kotze

Block

(2011). Housing satisfaction and quality of life in RDP houses in Braamfischerville, Soweto a South African case study. Urbani Izziv, 22, 138–143.

48.

M. P.

(2011). Fanon and the land question in (post)apartheid South Africa. In Gibson

N. C.

(Ed.) Living fanon: Global perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan, 173–186.

49.

Morris

(1998). “Our fellow Africans make our lives hell”: The lives of Congolese and Nigerians living in Johannesburg. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21, 1116–1136.

50.

Mosala

S. J.

Venter

J. M. C.

Bain

E. G.

(2019). The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) in South Africa: An ideological journey. KOERS: Bulletin for Christian Scholarship, 84, 1–16.

51.

Mubangizi

J. C.

(2021). Xenophobia in the labour market: A South African legal and human rights perspective. International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, 21, 139–156.

52.

Mutanda

(2022). Economic threat, new nationalism and xenophobia in South Africa: Some reflections. African Security Review, 31, 332–350.

53.

Myambo

M. T.

(2011). Capitalism disguised as democracy: A theory of “belonging,” not belongings, in the New South Africa. Comparative Literature, 63, 64–85.

54.

Nagar

Saunders

(2010). Building peace in Southern Africa. Centre for Conflict Resolution.

55.

Ncala

(2019). The critical state of health in SA. In Erasmus

(Ed.).

56.

Nkala

Masuku

(2023a). Foreigners in the South African Media: A critical discourse analysis. African Studies, 82, 1–23.

57.

Nkala

Masuku

(2023b). South Africa’s Media Often Portrays Foreigners in a Bad Light: This Fuels Xenophobia. The Conversation. Retrieved August 30, 2023, from https://theconversation.com/south-africas-media-often-portrays-foreigners-in-a-bad-light-this-fuels-xenophobia-204564

58.

Nyamnjoh

F. B.

(2010). Racism, ethnicity and the media in Africa: Reflections inspired by studies of xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa. Africa Spectrum, 45, 57–93.

59.

Nzongola-Ntalaja

(2004). Citizenship, political violence, and democratization in Africa. Global Governance, 10, 403–409.

60.

OECD & International Labour Organization. (2018). How immigrants contribute to South Africa’s economy. International Labour Organization.

61.

Okyere-Manu

(2016). Ethical implications of xenophobic attacks in South Africa a challenge to the Christian Church. CrossCurrents, 66, 227–238.

62.

Olofinbiyi

S. A.

(2022). Anti-immigrant violence and xenophobia in South Africa: Untreated malady and potential snag for national development. Insight on Africa, 14, 193–211.

63.

Parliamentary Liaison Office. (2017). RDP housing: Success or failure? Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference. SACBC.

64.

Pierce

G. L.

Holland

C. C.

Cleary

P. F.

Rabrenovic

(2022). The opportunity costs of the politics of division and disinformation in the context of the twenty-first century security deficit. SN Social Sciences, 2, 241.

65.

Pillay

Barolsky

Naidoo

Mohlakoan

Hadland

(2008). Citizenship, violence and xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African communities. Human Sciences Research Council.

66.

Polzer

(2010). “Xenophobia”: Violence against Foreign nationals and other “Outsiders” in contemporary South Africa. Migration Issue Brief 3.

67.

Rai

T. S.

Valdesolo

Graham

(2017). Dehumanization increases instrumental violence, but not moral violence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 8511–8516.

68.

Reilly

(2000). Democracy, ethnic fragmentation, and internal conflict: Confused theories, faulty data, and the “crucial case” of Papua New Guinea. International Security, 25, 162–185.

69.

Republic of South Africa. (2019). National action plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Government of South Africa.

70.

Sempijja

Mongale

C. O.

(2022). Xenophobia in urban spaces: Analyzing the drivers and social justice goals from the Ugandan—Asian debacle of 1972 and xenophobic attacks in South Africa (2008–2019). Frontiers in Sustainable Cities, 4, 1–11.

71.

Smith

D. L.

(2016). Paradoxes of dehumanization. Social Theory and Practice, 42, 416–443.

72.

Soyombo

O. T.

(2008). Xenophobia in contemporary society: A sociological analysis. IFE PsychologIA, 16, 1–20.

73.

Stats SA. (2019). Housebreaking is the number one crime in SA. Retrieved August 31, 2020, from https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12614

74.

Steinberg

(2012). Security and disappointment: Policing, freedom and xenophobia in South Africa. The British Journal of Criminology, 52, 345–360.

75.

Tarisayi

K. S.

Manik

(2020). An unabating challenge: Media portrayal of xenophobia in South Africa. Cogent Arts & Humanities, 7, 1859074.

76.

Tella

(2016). Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The individual, the state and the international system. Insight on Africa, 8, 142–158.

77.

Tella

Ogunnibi

(2014). Hegemony or survival: South Africa’s soft power and the challenge of xenophobia. Africa Insight, 44, 145–163.

78.

Tewolde

A. I.

(2023). Structural forces shape xenophobia in South Africa: Looking beyond the human agent. International Social Science Journal, 73, 599–612.

79.

Tshaka

(2016). Afrophobia versus xenophobia in South Africa. UNISA News.

80.

UNHCR. (2022). Ukraine: UN expert condemns racist threats, xenophobia at border. United Nations.

81.

Vanyoro

(2022). Migrants in South Africa have access to healthcare: Why it’s kicking up a storm. Retrieved August 8, 2023, form https://theconversation.com/migrants-in-south-africa-have-access-to-healthcare-why-its-kicking-up-a-storm-189574

82.

Webster

Adler

(1999). Toward a class compromise in South Africa’s “double transition”: Bargained liberalization and the consolidation of democracy. Politics & Society, 27, 347–385.

83.

Wyk

J. V.

(2009). Cadres, capitalists, elites and coalitions: The ANC, business and development in South Africa. The Nordic Africa Institute Discussion Papers.